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INTRODUCTION

Recent empirical studies by economists have shown, without exception,
that capital punishment deters crime. Using large data sets that combine
information from all fifty states over many years, the studies show that, on
average, an additional execution deters many murders. The studies have re
ceived much publicity, and death penalty advocates often cite them to show
that capital punishment is sound policy.
Indeed, deterrence is the central basis that many policymakers and
courts cite for capital punishment. For example, President Bush believes that
capital punishment deters crime and that deterrence is the only valid reason
for capital punishment. 1 Likewise, the Supreme Court, when it held in its
landmark 1976 decision that capital punishment was constitutional, cited
2
deterrence as one of its main reasons. Moreover, the Court confirmed that
I.
In the presidential debate with Al Gore on October 1 7, 2000, Bush was asked, "Do both of
you believe that the death penalty actually deters crime?" He responded, "I do, it's the only reason to be
for it . . . . I don't think you should support the death penalty to seek revenge. I don't think that's right. I
think the reason to support the death penalty is because it saves other people's lives." Election 2000
Presidential Debate with Republican Candidate Governor George W. Bush and Democratic Candidate
Vice President Al Gore (Oct. 1 7, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.debates.orf/pages/
trans2000c.html). In the debate, Gore also agreed that capital punishment deterred crime. Id.

2.

In Gregg v.

Georgia,

the Court provided as a main reason for upholding capital punishment:

We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for
whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death penalty
undoubtedly is a significant deterrent. There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder
for hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes
the decision to act. And there are some categories of murder, such as murder by a life prisoner,
where other sanctions may not be adequate.
428 U.S. 153, 1 85-86 ( 1 976).
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the main factor that motivated most state legislatures to prescribe capital
punishment was deterrence.3 Similarly, a central issue in debates on whether
4
federal law should include capital punishment is deterrence. We can also
reasonably assume that juries and trial judges, in deciding whether to im
pose or overturn death sentences, will incorporate common understandings
about deterrence. Governors may be similarly influenced in making deci
sions about clemency.
In contrast to the economic studies, recent studies by sociologists and
law professors have reached an opposite conclusion. The studies are often
restricted to a single state or small group of states rather than economists'
examination of the average for the nation as a whole. They usually find no
deterrence. Death penalty opponents cite these studies.
Each group tends to ignore the other's research. In this paper, I reconcile
the results and show that both conclusions can be correct.
Using the same large data set of U.S. counties from 1 977 to 1 996 that
many other crime studies use (and that I used in one of my earlier studies), I
change the focus from national averages for deterrence.5 Instead, I examine
whether capital punishment's impacts on murder rates differ among states.
The results are striking. Consider the twenty-seven states where at least
one execution occurred during the sample period. Executions deter murder
in only six states. Capital punishment, however, actually increases murder in
thirteen states, more than twice as many as experience deterrence. In eight
states, capital punishment has no effect on the murder rate. That is, execu
tions have a deterrent effect in only twenty-two percent of states. In contrast,
executions induce additional murders in forty-eight percent of states. In sev
enty-eight percent of states, executions do not deter murder.
I then explore why these differences exist among states. After
investigating various possible explanations, I identify an important factor
(although other factors are also undoubtedly important): on average, the
states where capital punishment deters murder execute many more people
than do the states where capital punishment incites crime or has no effect.
Using various statistical techniques, I show that a threshold number of
executions for deterrence exists, which is approximately nine executions
3.

The Court noted:

The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolu
tion of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical
studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not
available to the courts. Indeed, many of the post-Furman statutes reflect just such a responsible
effort to define those crimes and those criminals for which capital punishment is most proba
bly an effective deterrent.
Id. at 186 (citations omitted).

4.
For example, when Congress was considering whether to extend the federal death pen
alty to terrorist acts, I was asked to testify before the House Judiciary Committee about deterrence.
See Terrorist Penalties Enhancement Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2934 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (Apr. 21,

2004) (written testimony of Joanna M. Shepard), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/
pdfs/shepherd042 I 04.pdf.
5.

For a detailed discussion of the data, see infra text accompanying notes 31-33.
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during the sample period. In states that conducted more executions than the
threshold, executions, on average, deterred murder. In states that conducted
fewer executions than the threshold, the average execution increased the
murder rate or had no effect.
An intuitive explanation is that each execution has two opposing effects.
First, the execution creates a brutalization effect: it contributes to creating a
climate of brutal violence. The execution sets an example of killing to
avenge grievances, an example that some private individuals then follow.
Second, the execution creates some deterrence: potential criminals recog
nize that the state is willing to wield the ultimate penalty. For the first few
executions, however, the deterrent effect is small. Only if a state executes
many people does deterrence grow; only then do potential criminals become
convinced that the state is serious about the punishment, so that the crimi
nals start to reduce their criminal activity. When the number of executions
exceeds the threshold, the deterrence effect begins to outweigh the brutaliza
tion effect. In the seventy-eight percent of states where executions either
increase murders or have no effect, the brutalization effect either counter
balances or outweighs the deterrent effect. The deterrent effect outweighs
the brutalization effect only in six states.
The results suggest that earlier economic papers' focus on national aver
ages masked variation among states. Because the six states with deterrence,
such as Texas, execute many people, the executions in these states deter
many murders. In contrast, most of the states where executions increase
murder execute few people. When the large number of executions in the
deterrence states are averaged in with the small number of executions in all
of the other states, the large deterrent effect in those states dominates the
opposite brutalization effect in the other states. Thus the result from earlier
economics papers: on average, an execution in the United States deters
crime. This paper shows that these averages are powered by a handful of
high-execution, high-deterrence states. In most states, capital punishment
either increases murder or has no effect.
The results also explain the findings of no deterrence in papers that have
focused on individual states, rather than on the nation as a whole. As the
results here show, in seventy-eight percent of states, executions do not deter
murder.
All of the primary models' general lessons are consistent across two
other models that use data from other time periods and with different levels
of aggregation.
This Article's results have two important policy implications. First, poli
cymakers' false beliefs about capital punishment's universal deterrent effect
may have caused many people to die needlessly. If deterrence is capital pun
ishment's purpose, as is often stated by our president and others, then, in the
majority of states where executions do not deter crime, executions kill con
victs uselessly. Moreover, in the many states where the brutalization effect
outweighs the deterrent effect, executions not only kill convicts needlessly but
also induce the additional murders of many innocent people. A very rough
estimate is that, all told from 1 977 to 1996, executions in no-deterrence states
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have killed more than 5,000 innocent people, or 250 per year. Thus, in the
many states that execute without a deterrent effect, policymakers should
consider abandoning the death penalty. These states' executions do not deter
crime. If deterrence is the goal, capital punishment in these states simply
does not work. Instead, it needlessly kills both convicts and innocents.
Of course, if policymakers in the no-deterrence states have goals other
than deterrence, such as retribution, then they might continue capital pun
ishment, despite the absence of deterrence. In the many states, however,
where executions not only fail to deter but also cause additional murders of
innocent people, policymakers might think twice before permitting state
sponsored revenge that, in effect, kills innocent bystanders.
Second, suppose that a state was considering whether to start executing
people. It could not focus only on deterrence, ignoring other important
moral, legal, and economic issues. The state would need to recognize that
deterrence cannot be achieved with a half-hearted execution program.
Unless the state executed enough people to exceed the deterrence threshold,
then a large risk would exist that the executions would increase murders.
People in many states may be unwilling to establish such a large execution
program.
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. After Part II discusses
capital punishment's recent history in the United States, Part III reviews the
conflict in recent studies on capital punishment and deterrence. Part IV ex
plores differences in states' applications of capital punishment and tests the
effect on murder of executions in individual states. In Part V, I examine pos
sible causes of the different effects of executions on murder across states.
Part VI then offers results from two other models and data sets. Finally, Part
VII presents conclusions.
I. THE DEATH PENALTY'S RECENT HISTORY
IN THE UNITED STATES

During the first half of the twentieth century, executions were both fre
quent and popular. More executions occurred during the 1 930s than in any
other decade in U.S. history, an average of 1 67 executions each year. Al
though the use of capital punishment declined somewhat in the 1 940s and
1 950s, executions were still much more frequent than today: approximately
1 30 a year in the 1 940s and seventy-five a year during the 1 950s, compared
to an average of forty-eight per year in the 1 990s. 6 Over sixty-five percent of
7
the U.S. public approved of the death penalty during these decades.
In the late 1 950s, however, public support increasingly turned away
from the death penalty. Various social forces combined to reduce capital
punishment's popularity and use. Examples include growing doubts about
6.

See DEATH PENALT Y INFORMATION CENTER, HISTORY OF

7.

RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT IN AMERICA

I (2005),
TwentiethCentury.

PART

THE DEATH PENALTY,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=15&did=41O#EarlyandMid
20 (1991).
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the morality of the death penalty, consciousness that most of western Europe
had abandoned capital punishment, abatement of the crime wave of the
1 930s, lack of evidence that executions had a deterrent effect, strengthened
belief in the racially discriminatory use of the death penalty, and increasing
8
concern over the arbitrariness of the death penalty's application. Public ap
proval of capital punishment reached its lowest point in 1 966 when only
forty-two percent of the public supported it.9 Reflecting the public's growing
disapproval of capital punishment, the number of executions steadily de
clined throughout the 1 960s, and by 1968, they stopped altogether.
By the 1 960s, all states with capital punishment laws had changed them
from the mandatory statutes originally borrowed from English common law
to discretionary statutes. Under the new statutes, juries had complete control
over whether a defendant received a death sentence or not. This sentencing
freedom often caused application of the death penalty to seem arbitrary and
random. The U.S. Supreme Court began hearing cases involving the discre
tionary capital statutes in the late 1 960s. While the constitutionality of
capital punishment was being challenged, no states were willing to put peo
ple to death.
The Supreme Court finally resolved the constitutionality of discretionary
capital statutes in three cases in 1 972: Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Geor
w
gia, and B ranch v. Texas, collectively referred to as the Furman decision.
In a five-to-four decision, the justices held that discretionary capital statutes
resulted in arbitrary sentencing, violating the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause. This decision effectively voided forty
states' death penalty statutes and commuted the sentences of over 600 death
row inmates.
After Furman, the states quickly began to draft new death penalty laws.
Although some states passed mandatory capital statutes that the Supreme
Court soon found unconstitutional, others enacted guided discretion statutes.
These statutes provided juries with a set of factors they should consider
when making their death penalty determination. The Supreme Court ap- ,
11
proved these guided discretion statutes in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia, Jurek
13
v. Texas, 12 and Proffitt v. Florida, collectively referred to as the Gregg deci
sion. A major reason for the Court's holding that capital punishment was
constitutional was its conclusion that capital punishment deterred crime. 14
After the enactment of new, constitutional death penalty statutes, death
rows quickly filled. The moratorium on executions that began in 1 968 ended
in January 1 977, with the voluntary execution of Gary Gilmore in Utah. As
8.

THE DEATH PENALTY I N AMERICA

9.

PATERNOSTER,

supra note 7, at 19.

10.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).

11.

428 U.S. 153 (1976).

1 2.

428 U.S. 262 ( 1976).

13.

428 U.S. 242 (1976).

14.

See supra

note 2.

2 5 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982).
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Figure 1 reveals, the number of annual executions has steadily increased
since 1 977, peaking in 1 999 with ninety-eight executions. Since 1 977, there
have been 856 executions in thirty-two states. Today, the approval rating for
the death penalty is over seventy-four percent, after reaching an all-time
high of eighty percent in 1 994. 15
FIGURE I

U.S. M URDER RATE AND EXECUTIONS
10
100
"
II
I I
I
I

80

1'�

I
I

8

60

/\1

0

I I
I

6

i'-1II

\

4
1960

\
\. __________ ,,, ..... __

I

I
/\ I

)

1980
Year

1970

1 --- Murder Rate

40

/'�

',/

20

v

1990

"'
c
s
<.J
x
w
Q)

15
w
.c

§

z

0

2000

- - - - - Number of Executions

Despite the recent resurgence in executions, the use of the death penalty
varies widely across regions. Executions have been concentrated in the
South for most of this century, and the concentration there has recently be
come even stronger. Southern states accounted for approximately half of the
3,859 executions between 1 930 and 1 968.16 Of the executions since 1 977,
over seventy-five percent have occurred in the South. Southern states were
also, in general, less likely to abolish the death penalty before 1 972 and
quicker to reinstate it and execute people after 1 976.
In contrast, there has been considerable public disapproval of the death
penalty in other regions for centuries. Twelve midwestern and northern
states do not have capital punishment laws, and a number of these states
legally abolished the death penalty as early as the mid- 1 800s. Although
other states in these regions have capital punishment laws, several have per
formed no postmoratorium executions.
15.

Jeffrey M. Jones, Support

16.

FRANKLIN

for the Death Penalty Remains High at 74%; Slight Majority

Prefers Death Penalty to Life Imprisonment as Punishment for Murder, GALLUP NEWS SERV ICE,
May 1 9, 2003, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=592.
CAN AGENDA

E.
30 ( 1 986).

ZIMRING

&

GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT AND THE AMERI
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Historians and psychologists offer many potential explanations for the
differences in capital punishment's popularity between the South and other
regions: the South's tradition of lynching, Southern evangelical religions,
the region's prolonged rural/frontier experience, a history of racial
subjugation, the loss of the Civil War, and a siege mentality that places
blame on others.17
II. THE CONFLICT IN P REVIOUS STUDIES ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE

For decades, researchers have reached conflicting conclusions about
whether capital punishment deters crime. In order to explore the conflict, I
now describe both the earlier literature and recent research. In later Parts, I
present results that resolve the conflict.
A. Early Literature on Capital Punishment
and Deterrence
In the United States, whether capital punishment deters crime has been
debated for decades. The initial participants in the debate were psycholo
gists and criminologists. Their research was either theoretical or based on
comparisons of crime patterns in states with and without capital punish
ment. However, because they did not use multiple-regression statistical
techniques, the analyses were unable to distinguish the effect on murder of
18
capital punishment from the effects of other factors.
The debate in the economics literature began with Isaac Ehrlich's two
papers in 1 975 and 1 977. 19 Since the 1 960s, economists had been investigat
ing whether potential criminals, at least on average, rationally responded to
increased threats of punishment. 20 Economists theorized that potential
criminals would reduce their criminal activity if the expected costs to them
of their criminal behavior increased because of increased penalties. Ehrlich
was the first to use multivariate regression analysis to explore this hypothe
sis empirically with respect to capital punishment, testing whether the
number of murders would fall in response to increased imposition of the
death penalty. In contrast to earlier methods, this approach allowed Ehrlich
to separate the effects of many different factors on murder.

Dov Cohen & Richard E. Nisbett,

1 7.

See, e. g . ,

Self-Protection and the Culture of Honor:

1 8.

See, e. g. , H.J. E Y SENCK, CRIME AND PERSONALITY

Explaining Southern Violence, 20 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 55 1 ( 1 994);
Nisbett, Violence and U.S. Regional Culture, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 44 1 ( 1 993).

Richard E.

(Paladin 1 970) ( 1 964); J.

THORSTEN

SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY

( 1 959).

1 9. Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Addi
tional Evidence, 85 J. POL. EcoN. 741 ( 1 977); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 397 ( 1 975).
20. See, e. g . , Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
1 69 ( 1 968).

ECON.
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Ehrlich's 1 975 paper examined U.S. time-series data for the period
1 933-1969. Time-series data are data for one unit (for Ehrlich, for the entire
U.S.) over several time periods. He tested the effect on national murder rates
of possible deterrent variables (the probabilities of arrest, conviction, and
execution), demographic variables (population, fraction of nonwhites, and
fraction of people age fourteen to twenty-four), economic variables (labor
force participation, unemployment rate, real per capita permanent income,
per capita government expenditures, and per capita expenditures on police),
and a time variable. He found a statistically significant negative relationship
between the murder rate and execution rate, indicating a deterrent effect:
more executions meant less crime. Specifically, he estimated that each exe
cution resulted in approximately seven or eight fewer murders.
Next, Ehrlich's 1 977 paper studied cross-sectional data from the fifty
states in 1 940 and 1950. Cross-sectional data are data from several units
(here, the fifty states) for one time period ( 1 940 or 1 950). That is, instead of
his first paper's approach of testing how the total U.S. murder rate changed
across time as the national execution rate changed, Ehrlich now explored the
relationship during a single year between each of the states' execution rates
and their murder rates.
Again, Ehrlich used multivariate regression analysis to separate the ef
fect on murder of different factors. He included possible deterrent variables
(probabilities of conviction and execution, median time spent in prison, and
a "dummy" variable that distinguished executing states from nonexecuting
states), demographic variables (state population, urban population, percent
of nonwhites, and percent of people age fifteen to twenty-four and twenty
five to thirty-four), and economic variables (median family income and per
cent of families with income below half of the median income). Again, his
findings indicated a substantial deterrent effect of capital punishment on
murder.
Ehrlich's finding loosed a flood of interest in econometric analysis of
capital punishment and deterrence. The papers that immediately followed
Ehrlich used his original data ( 1 933-1969 national time-series or 1 940 and
1 950 state-level cross-section) and variants of his econometric model.
The results were mixed. Many found a deterrent effect of capital
punishment, but others did not. For example, using Ehrlich's data, studies by
21
Yunker, Cloninger, and Ehrlich and Gibbons found a deterrent effect. In
contrast, Bowers and Pierce, Passel and Taylor, and Hoenack and Weiler
found no deterrence when they used the same data with alternative
specifications. 22 Similarly, McAleer and Veall, Leamer, and McManus found
Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 6 1.
87, 98 ( 1 977); Isaac Ehrlich & Joel Gibbons, On the Measurement of the Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence, 6 1. LEGAL STUD. 35 ( 1 977); James A.
Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent to Homicide? Some Time Series Evidence, 5 1. BEHAV.
ECON. 45 ( 1 976).

21.

Dale 0. Cloninger,

BEHAV. EcoN.

22.

William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's
L.1. 1 87 ( 1 975); Stephen A. Hoenack & William C.

Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE

Weiler,

A Structural Model of Murder Behavior and the Criminal Justice System, 70 AM. EcoN.
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no deterrent effect when different variables were included over the same
sample period. 23 Finally, Black and Orsagh found mixed results depending
on the cross-section year they used.24
In the late 1980s and 1 990s, a second generation of econometric studies
extended Ehrlich's national time-series data or used more recent cross
sectional data. As before, some papers found deterrence while others did
not. For example, Cover and Thistle and Layson used an extension of
Ehrlich's national time-series data, covering up to 1 977.25 Although Layson
found a significant deterrent effect of executions, Cover and Thistle cor
rected for data flaws and found no deterrent effect. Chressanthis employed
national time-series data covering 1 966 through 1 985 and found a deterrent
effect. 26 In contrast, Grogger used daily data for California during 1 960-27
1 963 and found no deterrent effect.
Most of the early studies-both the first wave and the second genera
tion-suffered from basic flaws: they suffered important data limitations
because they used either national time-series or cross-section data. Using
national time-series data created a serious aggregation problem. Any deter
rence from an execution should affect the crime rate only in the executing
state; one state's high execution rate would not be expected to change the
crime rate in nearby states, where the first state's laws and execution pro
clivity do not apply.
Aggregation-lumping all states together in a national time series
diluted such distinct effects, creating "aggregation bias." For example, sup
pose that the following happened concurrently: the murder rate in a state
with no executions randomly increased at the same time that the murder rate
dropped in a state with many executions. Aggregate data might incorrectly
lead to an inference of no deterrence; the aggregate data, with the two states
lumped together, would show an increase in executions leading to no change
in the murder rate.
Cross-sectional studies also suffer serious problems. Most importantly,
they prevent researchers from using so-called "fixed-effects estimation" to
control for jurisdiction-specific characteristics that could be related to mur327 ( 1 980); Peter Passell & John B. Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An
other View, 67 AM. EcoN. REV. 445 ( 1977).

REV.

23.
Edward E. Leamer, Let's Take the Con out of Econometrics, 73 AM. EcoN. REV. 3 1
( 1 983); Michael McAleer & Michael R. Veall, How Fragile are Fragile Inferences? A Re-Evaluation
of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 7 1 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 99 ( 1 989); Walter S.
McManus, Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: The Importance of the Re
searcher's Prior Beliefs, 93 J. PoL. EcoN. 4 1 7 ( 1 985).
24.
Theodore Black & Thomas Orsagh, New Evidence on the Efficacy of Sanctions as a
Deterrent to Homicide, 58 Soc. Sci. Q. 6 1 6 ( 1 978).
25. James Peery Cover & Paul D. Thistle, Time Series, Homicide, and the Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment, 54 S. EcoN. J. 6 1 5 ( 1 988); Stephen K. Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A
Reexamination of the United States Time-Series Evidence, 52 S. EcoN. 1. 68 ( 1 985).
26. George A. Chressanthis, Capital Punishment and the Deterrent Effect Revisited: Recent
Time-Series Econometric Evidence, 1 8 J. BEHAV. EcoN. 8 1 ( 1 989).
27. Jeffrey Grogger, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Daily
Homicide Counts,.85 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 295 ( 1 990).
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der. For example, with cross-section data, a researcher cannot control for
fundamental but immeasurable variables, such as a violent culture in certain
28
states. Cross-section data also preclude any consideration of what happens
to crime, law enforcement, and judicial processes over time.
Moreover, both time-series and cross-section data shared the problem of
having few observations. For example, for the year analyzed, Ehrlich's na
tional time-series data had only thirty-seven observations and his cross
section data had only fifty observations. With so few observations, strong
statistical conclusions are impossible.
Noting the inadequacy of time-series and cross-section data, several au
thors called for new research using panel data, an approach that I describe
below.29 In addition, a National Academy of Sciences panel convened to
study the early deterrence literature. It concluded that new research should
be conducted with disaggregated data that looked at smaller geographic
units, such as counties or cities rather than the nation as a whole, and
smaller time periods, such as months rather than years. The panel also sug
gested that new studies examine the impact of executions on different types
of homicides.30
Researchers responded to the invitation. In addition to using panel data,
several new studies employ disaggregated data of the sort recommended by
the panel. Likewise, another study examined executions' impacts on differ
ent homicide types. I now discuss these modern studies of the past decade.
B . Modern Studies of Capital Punishment's
Deterrent Effect
Most recent studies have overcome the fundamental problems associated
with national time-series and cross-section data by using panel data tech
niques. "Panel data" are data from several units (the fifty states or all U.S.
counties) over several different time periods. That is, panel data follow a
cross-section over time. For example, a panel dataset might include data on
each of the fifty states, or even on each U.S. county, for a series of years.
Panel data produce many more observations than cross-section or time
series data. For example, a state-level, panel data set of fifty states over ten
years would have 500 observations. By contrast, a national, time-series data
set over the same period would have only ten observations and a state-level,
cross-section data set from one of the years would have only fifty
28.
Technically, cross-sectional studies are affected by unobserved heterogeneity that cannot
be controlled for in the absence of time variation. The heterogeneity is caused by jurisdiction
specific characteristics that may correlate with other variables of the model, resulting in biased,
incorrect estimates.
See, e.g., K.L. Avio, Capita[ Punishment, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
205 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Samuel Cameron, A Review of the
Econometric Evidence on the Effects of Capital Punishment, 23 J. Soc10-EcoN. 1 97 ( 1 994).
29.

EcoNOMICS AND THE LAW

30.
See NAT'L. ACAD. SCI., Report of the Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative
Effects, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: E STIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
ON CRIME RATES I (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1 978).
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observations. Through inexorable statistical laws, more observations permit
more accurate measurement of the capital punishment's impacts.
Furthermore, panel data allow researchers to control for important juris
dictional differences among U.S. states or counties by using fixed-effects
estimation (which cross-section data cannot do), while avoiding aggregation
bias (a problem of time-series data). Several studies have analyzed data that
are more disaggregated than in the early studies. This minimizes aggrega
tion bias over geographic units or periods of time, enabling researchers to
estimate any deterrent effect more precisely. In addition to enjoying the
benefits of panel data, recent studies have access to more recent data that
make conclusions more relevant for the current environment.
In the past decade, eight papers have been written in the economics lit
erature that use improved panel data and more sophisticated regression
techniques. Their conclusion is unanimous: all of the modern economics
papers find evidence of deterrence. Four other papers in the past decade
have not used panel data, but also find a deterrent effect. Several studies,
however, in sociology journals and law reviews have produced mixed re
sults; some find deterrence while others do not.
1 . Modern Economics Papers Using
Panel-Data Techniques
All of the modern papers that use panel-data analysis find a deterrent ef
fect.
i. Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin, and I examined whether
deterrence existed using county-level panel data from 3,054 U.S. counties
over the period 1 977-1996.31 This is the only study to use county-level data,
allowing us to estimate better the demographic, economic, and jurisdictional
differences among U.S. counties that can affect murder rates. Moreover, the
large number of county-level observations extended the empirical tests'
reliability. 32 We found a substantial deterrent effect; both death row
sentences and the executions themselves resulted in decreases in the murder
rate. Our conservative estimate was that each execution results in, on
average, eighteen fewer murders. Our main finding, that capital punishment
has a deterrent effect, was consistent across many different ways of
33
performing the statistical analysis.
ii. In another paper, I used state-level, monthly panel data from 1 977 to
1 999 to examine two gaps in the capital punishment literature. 34 First, I in3 1 . Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect ? New
Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. LAW & EcoN. REV. 344 (2003).
32. Technically, it extends the analysis' degrees of freedom, increases variability, and re
duces colinearity among variables.
33. The deterrent effect remains with different choices of functional form (double-log, semi
log, or linear), state-level vs. county-level analysis, sampling period, endogenous vs. exogenous
probabilities, and level vs. ratio specification of the main variables.
34. Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capi
tal Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004).
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vestigated the types of murders deterred by capital punishment. Some peo
35
ple believe that certain types of murder are not deterrable. To the contrary,
I found that the combination of death row sentences and executions deterred
all types of murders: murders between intimates, acquaintances, and strang
ers, crime-of-passion murders and murders committed during other felonies,
and murders of African American and white people.36 I estimated that each
death row sentence deters approximately 4.5 murders and that each execu
tion deterred approximately three murders.
The second issue that the paper addressed is the impact on deterrence of
execution delays. In 1 996, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1 996 that limits federal habeas review in capital cases.
If criminals prefer lengthy death row waits to short ones, as their numerous
appeals and requests for stays suggest, then shortening the time until execu
tion could increase the death penalty's deterrent impact. I found that shorter
waits on death row increased deterrence. Specifically, one extra murder is
deterred for every 2.75-years reduction in the death row wait before each
execution.
iii. Hashem Dezhbakhsh and I used state-level panel data from 1 960 to
2000 to examine capital punishment's deterrent effect. 37 This was the only
study to use data from before, during, and after the 1 972-1976 Supreme
Court moratorium on executions. Our study advanced the deterrence litera
ture by exploiting an important characteristic that other studies overlooked:
the experimental nature of the Supreme Court moratorium.
First, we performed before-and-after moratorium comparisons. Specifi
cally, we compared the murder rate for each state immediately before and
after it suspended or reinstated the death penalty. These before-and-after
comparisons were informative because many factors that affected crime
for example, law enforcement, judicial, demographic, and economic vari
ables-changed only slightly over a short period of time. In addition, the
moratorium began and ended in different years in different states. Consider
ing the different start and end dates, the duration of the moratoriu m varied
considerably across states, ranging from four to thirty years. Observing
similar changes in murder rates immediately after the same legal change in
different years and in various states provided compelling evidence of the
moratorium's effect on murder. The before-and-after comparisons revealed
that about ninety-one percent of states experienced an increase in murder

35. They claim that murders by intimates or crimes of passion are products of uncontrollable
rage, and they are therefore nondeterrable. Others even argue executions could even increase the
number of murders by strangers, as the brutality of executions incites criminals.
36. Intimates are defined as spouses, common-law spouses, parents, children, siblings, in
laws, step-relations, and other family. Crime-of-passion murders include lovers' triangles, murders
by babysitters, brawls under alcohol, brawls under drugs, arguments over money, other arguments,
and abortion-murders (abortions performed during the murder of the mother).
37. Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punish
ment: Evidence from a 'Judicial Experiment,' (Emory Univ., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 04-04, 2004).
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rates after they suspended the death penalty. In about seventy percent of the
cases, the murder rate dropped after the state reinstated the death penalty.
We supplemented the before-and-after comparisons with time-series and
panel-data regression analyses that, unlike many existing studies, used both
pre- and postmoratorium data. The regressions disentangled the impact of
the moratorium itself on murder from the effect of actual executions on
murder; we found that the moratorium had a significant positive effect on
murder and that executions had significant negative effects on murder. These
estimates suggested that both adopting a capital statute and exercising it
a
D
have strong deterrent euects.
iv. John R. Lott, Jr. and William M. Landes used state-level panel data
from 1 977 to 1 995 to examine whether right-to-carry concealed handgun
laws deterred multiple-victim public shootings. 39 Included in their analysis
were tests of the deterrent effect of executions on murder. The authors found
that right-to-carry concealed handgun laws do result in fewer multiple vic
tim public shootings. They also found that executions have a significant
deterrent effect on the overall murder rate. Specifically, a one percent in
crease in the execution rate was associated with a seven percent decline in
the overall murder rate.
v. and vi. Two papers by FCC economist Paul Zimmerman found a de
terrent effect.40 In his first paper, Zimmerman used state-level panel data
from 1 978 to 1 997 to examine the relationship between state execution rates
and murder rates. In his second paper, he employed state-level panel data
from 1 978 to 2000 to examine which execution methods had the strongest
deterrent effects. In both papers, Zimmerman found a significant deterrent
effect of capital punishment. He estimated that each execution deterred an
average of fourteen murders and that executions by electrocution had the
strongest impact.
.
vii. H. Naci Mocan and R. Kaj Gittings used state-level panel data from
1 977 to 1 997 to examine the relationship between executions, commuta
41
tions, and murder. Again, the authors found a significant deterrent effect;
they estimated that each execution deterred an average of five murders.

38. We also confirm that our results hold up to changes in our choice of regressors, estima
tion method, and functional form. The deterrent variables' coefficients are remarkably consistent in
sign and significance across eighty-four different regression models. In addition, we verify that the
negative relationship between the death penalty and murder is not a spurious finding. Before-and
after moratorium comparisons and regressions reveal that the death penalty does not cause a de
crease in property crimes, suggesting that the deterrent effect is not reflecting general trends in
crime.
39. John R. Lott, Jr. & William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public Shootings, Bombings,
and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law Enforcement
(Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 73, 2000).
40. Paul R. Zimmerman, Estimates of the Deterrent Effect ofAlternative Execution Methods
in the United States: 1978-2000, AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Zimmerman,
Alternative Execution Methods]; Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Inci
dence of Murder, Mar. 3, 2003, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=354680.
4 1 . H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the
Deterrellt Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & E coN . 453 (2003).
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Their results also indicated that both commuting death row prisoners' sen
tences and removing them from death row increased in murder. Specifically,
each commutation resulted in approximately five extra murders and each
removal from death row generated one additional murder.
viii. A recent paper by Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt, and Ellen Shus
torovich used state-level panel data covering the period 1 950-1990 to
measure the relationship between prison conditions, capital punishment, and
crime rates. 42 They found that the nonexecution death rate among prisoners
(a proxy for prison conditions) had a significant, negative relationship with
overall violent crime rates and property crime rates; worse prison conditions
deterred crime. As expected, the execution rate had no statistically signifi
cant relationship with overall violent crime rates (which consist mainly of
robbery and aggravated assault rates) and property crime rates; that is, exe
cutions had no effect on noncapital crimes.
The authors estimated several different models to test for a relationship
between the execution rate and murder rates. Although some specifications
showed no relationship, many models, especially those that controlled for
the economic and demographic differences among states, did produce a de
terrent effect.
2. Modern Economics Papers Using Other Techniques
All modem economics papers that used techniques other than panel data
also found deterrence.
i. Instead of a panel data study, Dale 0. Cloninger and Roberto
Marchesini conducted a portfolio analysis that was, in effect, a controlled
group experiment: the Texas unofficial moratorium on executions during
most of 1 996.43 They found both that the moratorium appeared to have
caused additional homicides and that murder rates significantly decreased
after the moratorium was lifted.
ii. Harold J. Brumm and Dale 0. Cloninger used cross-sectional data
covering fifty-eight cities in 1 985 to distinguish between criminals' per
ceived risk of punishment and the ex-post risk of punishment measured by
arrest rates, conviction rates, or execution rates.44 They found that the per
ceived risk of punishment, including the probability of execution, was
negatively and significantly correlated with the homicide commission rate.
iii. and iv. Two other papers, one by Isaac Ehrlich and Zhiqiang Liu and
the other by Zhiqiang Liu, used Ehrlich's original state-level, cross-section
data.45 Both found a strong deterrent effect.
42. Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L.
& EcoN. REV. 3 1 8 (2003).
43. Dale 0. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi
Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED EcoN. 569 (200 1 ).
44. Harold J. Brumm & Dale 0. Cloninger, Perceived Risk of Punishment and the Commis
sion of Homicides: A Covariance Structure Analysis, 3 1 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 ( 1 996).
45. Isaac Ehrlich & Zhiqiang Liu, Sensitivity Analyses of the Deterrence Hypothesis: lets
Keep the Econ in Econometrics, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 455 (1999); Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment and
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3. Modern Papers by Sociologists and Criminologists
Sociologists have also studied the deterrent effect of capital punishment
in several papers in sociology journals in the past decade. Although they
employed empirical analysis, the methods they used are often very different
from the methods used by economists. In contrast to the economics studies,
most of the sociology studies find no deterrence.
i. John K. Cochran, Mitchell B . Chamlin, and Mark Seth examined the
deterrence question using weekly, time-series data from Oklahoma from
1 989 to 1 99 1 .46 Although their weekly data was very disaggregated by time,
the researchers severely restricted the number of observations in their study
by limiting their analyses to the state of Oklahoma. Thus, they have only
1 56 observations. In fact, only one execution took place in Oklahoma during
this period. Furthermore, the authors included no variables to control for
demographic, economic, law enforcement, or other factors on murder rates.
The researchers concluded that there was no deterrent effect because they
found no evidence of deterrence after the one execution during their sample
period.
ii. William Bailey used the same data as Cochran, Chamlin, and Seth to
explore the deterrence issue and found no evidence of a deterrence effect.47
Although his data suffered from having few observations and only one exe
cution, Bailey extended the analyses to include control variables. Moreover,
Bailey examined the effect of executions in other states on Oklahoma's
murder rate. Although most capital punishment studies had assumed that
deterrence was limited to the state where the execution occurs, Bailey meas
ured whether there was a cross-state effect. He found no evidence of a
deterrent effect within states or across states.
iii. A paper by Jon Sorensen, Robert Wrinkle, Victoria Brewer, and
James Marquart tested the deterrence hypothesis in Texas.48 The authors
used monthly time-series data from the state of Texas from 1 984 to 1 997
and found no deterrent effect when including the appropriate control vari
ables.49
the Deterrence Hypothesis: Some New Insights and Empirical Evidence, 30 E. EcoN. J. 237 (2004).
The study by Ehrlich and Liu offers a theory-based sensitivity analysis of estimated deterrent effects.
Liu 's study uses switching regression techniques in estimations that take into account the endoge
nous nature of the status of the death penalty.
46. John K. Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization ? An Impact Assessme/11 of Okla
homa's Return to Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 1 07 ( 1 994).
47.
William C. Bailey, Deterrence, Brutalization, and the Death Penalty: Another Examina
tion of Oklahoma's Return to Capital Punishment, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 7 1 1 ( 1 998).
48. Jon Sorenson et al., Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Examining the Effect of Execu
tions on Murder in Texas, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 481 ( 1 999).
49. The authors restricted their analysis to an ordinary least squares regression that assumed
that the causality between murder and law enforcement variables ran in only one direction: convic
tion rates, incarceration rates, and executions affected crime rates, but crime rates did not affect
conviction rates, incarceration rates, or executions. In contrast, almost all other capital punishment
papers assumed that causality runs in both directions; for example, increasing murders may lead
officials to direct more resources to fighting crime, increasing convictions, incarcerations, and exe-
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iv. James A . Yunker tested the deterrence hypothesis using two sets of
postmoratorium data: state cross-section data from 1 976 to 1997, and national
time-series data from 1 930 to 1 997. 50 These data were vulnerable to many of
the same criticisms as early economic studies. National time-series data may
cause aggregation bias; cross-section data could not consider trends in crime
or law enforcement variables and failed to control for omitted jurisdiction
specific variables that may affect crime. He found a strong deterrent effect
in the time-series data that disappeared when the data were limited to the
1 930-197 6 period. Therefore, he concluded that postmoratorium data was
critical in testing of the deterrence hypothesis.
v. A paper by Richard Berk, a sociologist, found that eliminating a few
specific states from the data caused estimates of capital punishment's aver
51
age impact on murders across all states to show no deterrence.
4. Modern Papers in Law Reviews
Two empirical papers testing whether capital punishment deters have
been published in law reviews in the past decade. Both found no deterrence.
i. Craig J. Albert tested the deterrence hypothesis using state-level panel
52
data from 1 982 to 1994. He includes many of the same control variables as
Ehrlich did in his early studies, but does not include any time variables. Like
Ehrlich, he also performed both ordinary least squares regressions and two
stage least squares regressions. Albert found no evidence of a deterrent ef
fect.
ii. Lisa Stolzenberg and Stewart J. D ' Alessio used monthly data and a
different statistical procedure from other papers to examine the relationship
between the frequency of executions, newspaper publicity, and the incidence
of murder in Houston, Texas.53 They examined the period from January 1 990
to December 1 994. The authors included no control variables to capture
changes in economic, demographic, or other factors during the time period.
The authors reported no deterrent effect.
5. A Theory for Reconciling the Results
Although the results of all of the articles in economics journals sup
ported the deterrence hypothesis, this consensus did not cross disciplines.
cutions. Ignoring the reverse causality could lead to biased results that underestimate, overestimate,
or reverse the impact of law enforcement variables on crime.
50. James A. Yunker, A New Statistical Analysis of Capital Punishment Incorporating U.S.
Postmoratorium Data, 82 Soc. Sci. Q. 297 (200 1 ).
5 1 . Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Deja Vu All Over
Again ?, Mar. 1 1 , 2005, available at h ttp://preprints.stat.ucla.edu/396/JELS.pap.pdf.
52. Craig J. Albert, Challenging Deterrence: New Insights on Capital Punishment Derived
from Panel Data, 60 U. PITT. L. REV . 32 1 ( 1 999).
53. They use "fully recursive vector ARMA [regressions] . . . ." Lisa Stolzenberg & Stewart
J. D' Alessio, Capital Punishment, Execution Publicity and Murder in Houston, Texas, 94 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 35 1 , 352 (2004).
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Most of the articles in sociology journals and law reviews found no evi
dence of a deterrent effect.
The contrasting conclusions may all be correct if capital punishment's
impact on the murder rate differs among jurisdictions. Because the studies
examined different jurisdictions in different periods, some may examine
jurisdictions that have an overall deterrent effect while others examine juris
dictions that experience no deterrence. The rest of this Article will explore
both whether the deterrent effect differs across states and possible causes of
the earlier studies' differing results.
Ill. TESTING THE D ETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS AMONG STATES
After reviewing differences in the frequency and manner with which
states apply capital punishment, I describe my empirical model for testing
executions' impact on murders in each state. I then discuss the model's re
sults: executions' impact varies widely among states, deterring murders in
some states, but increasing them in others. Finally, I show how this Article's
results reconcile results from earlier papers.
A. Differences in the Application of Capital Punishment across States
There are great differences in the application of the death penalty across
states. For example, states vary widely in their definitions of capital crimes,
their frequency of imposing capital sentences, their frequency of executions,
their methods of execution, and the publicity their executions receive. These
important differences might affect the deterrent impact of each states' execu
tions.
Table 1 and Appendices 1 through 3 present some of the important dif
ferences between states' application of the death penalty. Appendix 1
discusses the crimes punishable by death as of 2001 . It is difficult precisely
to compare states' laws for capital punishment because states define first
degree murder and aggravating factors differently. But there are important
differences in the crimes punishable by death. For example, in Georgia, any
murder is technically a death-eligible crime, although, of course, the U.S.
Constitution substantially limits the reach of Georgia's death penalty. In
contrast, Alabama and Pennsylvania treat only first-degree murders with
eighteen aggravating circumstances to be punishable by death.
Although the legislation listed in Appendix 1 tells us what crimes could
be punished by death in each state, states vary tremendously in how often
they actually sentence people to death. Table 1 reports the number of death
row sentences imposed between 1 977 and 1 996; the table includes informa
tion only on states that have actually sentenced people to death during this
period. 54 The numbers vary from an extreme high of 7 1 3 death row sen
tences in Florida to only one death row sentence in New York.
54. For this table, I limit my sample to 1 977-1996 because my empirical estimations cover
this period.
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TABLE I
E XECUTIONS AND DEATH Row S ENTENCES: 1 977-1 996

Number of Death

Number of

Row Sentences

Executions

Alabama

294

13

Arizona

207

6

Arkansas

90

12

California

560

4

Colorado

12

0

Connecticut

6

0

Delaware

22

8

Florida

713

38

Georgia

226

22

Idaho

34

1

Illinois

262

8

State

Indiana

82

4

Kentucky

60

0
23

Louisiana

1 28

Maryland

47

1

Mississippi

1 33

4

Missouri

1 42

23

Montana

10

1

Nebraska

19

2

Nevada

119

6

New Jersey

48

0

New Mexico

13

0

New York

1

0

North Carolina

308

8

Ohio

249

0

Oklahoma

238

8

Oregon

52

1

Pennsylvania

283

2

South Carolina

1 29

11

South Dakota

2

0

Tennessee

1 42

0

Texas

668

1 07

Utah

17

5

Virginia

1 04

37

Washington

28

2

5

1

Wyoming

As with death sentences, the number of executions that states perform
varies substantially. The last column of Table 1 reports each state's number
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of executions performed between 1 977 and 1 996. Some states produce
many death sentences, but few executions. For example, during the sample
period, California condemned 560 people, but executed only four. Twelve
states do not have laws that authorize capital punishment: Alaska, Hawaii,
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Of the thirty-eight states that
currently have capital punishment laws, eleven had performed no executions
prior to 1 997: Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire,
55
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, and Tennessee.
At the other extreme, Texas performed 1 07 executions between 1 977 and
1 997.
Appendix 2 lists the authorized methods of execution by state. All states
except Nebraska allow executions by lethal injection; Nebraska still requires
electrocution. 56 Some states allow prisoners to choose between lethal injec
tion and electrocution. Utah allows prisoners to be executed by firing squad
if the inmates chose this method before the passage of legislation in 2004
banning the practice.57
States also differ in how much publicity each execution receives. Ap
pendix 3 reports each state's average number of newspaper articles and news
transcripts found on LexisNexis that covered each execution between 1 997
and 1 999.58 The numbers differ widely: Colorado and Ohio had averages of
over 700 news reports (including both newspapers and transcripts) for each
of their executions, probably because of their novelty, as these were the first
executions in the states. At the other extreme, there was only one news tran
script on LexisNexis reporting on Montana's 1 998 execution.
The substantial differences in both the application of capital punishment
and publicity about it might cause differences in whether each state's execu
tions are a deterrent. The next Section explores whether there are differences
in executions' impact among states.
To be sure, there are many other differences among states in the applica
tion of capital punishment. However, most of the differences, such as
whether capital punishment is applied unfairly or in a racist manner, are
impossible to measure. Standard statistics demonstrates that the absence
from the analysis of these other factors will not harm the results except in
55. Colorado and Kentucky performed their first executions in 1 997, New Mexico executed
its first prisoner in 200 1 , Ohio performed its first execution in 1 999, and Tennessee executed its first
prisoner in 2000. New York's death penalty law was declared unconstitutional in 2004. People v.
LaValle, 8 1 7 N.E.2d 34 1 , 344 (N.Y. 2004).
56.

Nebraska's last execution was in 1 997, by electrocution.

57. Two of Utah's six executions since 1 977 have been by firing squad. Four more execu
tions by firing squad are scheduled for upcoming years.
58. I used LexisNexis to search for the name of each executed person in the month before
the execution, the month of the execution, and the month after the execution. I searched both news
papers in the state where the execution took place and all news transcripts. Although the numbers
are good approximations of the amount of publicity each execution receives, they are not perfect
because LexisNexis does not cover all newspapers and started covering some newspapers in the mid
to late 1 990s. I searched for executions only after 1 997 to minimize the problem of lack of or un
even coverage.
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the rare situation where the omitted factors are closely correlated with the
59
included variables.
B . Data and Empirical Model
Because the data and techniques of my 2003 paper60 were accepted in a
leading peer-reviewed journal and have become well-known in the capital
61
punishment debate, I use the same data and similar analyses as before as
my model, except that I now test the effect of executions in different states.
The data are a panel-data set that covers 3,054 counties for the 1 977-1996
period. It is a well-known data set that has been used not only in my 2003
capital-punishment paper, but in several other empirical studies of crime.62
The county-level data allow me to include county-specific characteristics in
my analysis; I discuss the county-level economic and demographic variables
below. This reduces the aggregation problem from which much of the litera
ture suffers. By controlling for these characteristics, I can better isolate the
effect of punishment policy.63
To test capital punishment's effect in different states, I estimate a system
of equations that represents the interaction between criminals and the

59.

See PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO EcoNOMETRICS 91 (3d ed. 1 992).

60.

Dezhbakhsh et al., supra note 3 1 .

6 1 . Publicity surrounding the original study included television interviews on CNN Sunday;
National Fox News; The O'Reilly Factor on the National Fox News Network; and CBS, ABC, and
FOX local affiliates. Print interviews included the Chronicle of Higher Education and The Atlanta
Business Chronicle. Radio interviews included BBC; Five Alive; WJR in Detroit, MI; KRLD in
Arlington, TX; WLW in Cincinnati, OH; KTSA in San Antonio, TX; CHED in Edmonton, Canada;
WRVA in Richmond, VA; CJME in Saskatoon, Canada; NTR in Saskatoon, Canada; WMVZ in
Detroit, Ml; KXNT in Las Vegas, NV; and KRLA in Los Angeles, CA. The paper was also cited in
the National Center for Policy Analysis; Executive Alert; The Weekly Standard; and The National
Journal. The paper was also requested for use by the Senate Judiciary Committee; U.S. Naval Acad
emy; House of Representatives (Rep. Bob Goodlatt); Attorney General of Alabama; New York State
Assembly (Stephen Kaufman); and the Chief of Criminal Appeals Division of Chicago (Renee
Goldfarb).
62. Dezhbakhsh et al., supra note 3 1 ; see also EA RL L. GRINOLS ET AL., CASINOS, CRIME
AND COMMUNITY COSTS (Univ. of Ill . & Univ. of Ga., Working Paper, 2000); LOTT, JR. & LANDES,
supra note 39; Eric D. Gould et al., Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the
United States: 1979-1997, 84 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 45 (2002); John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard,
Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL S T UD. 1 , 39-48 ( 1 997);
David B. Mustard, Reexamining Criminal Behavior: The Importance of Omitted Variable Bias, 85
REV. EcoN. & STAT. 205 (2003); Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent
Effect of California's Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 3 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (2002); Joanna M.
Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth about Truth-in
Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & EcoN. 509 (2002).
63. Moreover, panel data allow me to overcome the unobservable heterogeneity problem that
affects cross-sectional studies. Neglecting heterogeneity can lead to biased estimates. I use the time
dimension of the data to estimate county-fixed effects and condition my two-stage estimation on
these effects. This is equivalent to using county dummies to control for unobservable variables that
differ among counties. This way I control for the unobservable heterogeneity that arises from county
specific attributes such as attitudes towards crime, or crime reporting practices. These attributes may
be correlated with the justice-system variables (or other exogenous variables of the model) giving
rise to endogeneity and biased estimation. An advantage of the data set is its resilience to common
panel problems such as self-selectivity, nonresponse, attrition, or sampling design shortfalls.
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criminal justice system. Such systems are commonly used in empirical
64
studies of crime, and especially in empirical studies of capital punishment.
A system of equations, instead of a single equation, is required because of
the relationship between murder rates and the behavior of the police and
court system. Specifically, if there is a deterrent effect, then increases in
what I call the "deterrent factors"-the probability of arrest, the probability
of receiving a death row sentence, or the probability of execution-should
cause murder rates to decrease. However, the causal relationship could also
run in the other direction: increases in murder rates could pressure police,
prosecutors, judges, and juries to increase arrest rates, death row sentencing
rates, and execution rates. Because a single-equation model would be unable
to capture, and correct for, the reverse causality, the model could produce
biased, incorrect results. My system of equations addresses that problem.
1. A Summary of the Model

The model has four equations. The first equation examines the influ
ences on the murder rate of various factors, including the deterrent
variables; the second through fourth equations model the influence on each
of the deterrent variables. In a nutshell:
The first equation measures how murder rates respond to the deterrent
variables and other demographic and economic factors;
the second equation measures the effect on the first deterrent variable,
the probability of arrest, of murder rates and police expenditures;
the third equation measures the effect on the second deterrent variable,
the probability of a capital sentence, of murder rates, expenditures on
the judicial system, prison admissions, and a partisan influence variable
that measures the political conservatism of a state's voters; and
the fourth equation measures the effect on the final deterrent variable,
the probability of execution, of murder rates, expenditures on the judi
cial system, and a partisan influence variable.

The system of equations is the same system used in my previous capital
punishment paper65 with one exception: instead of using one execution vari
able that estimates the average deterrent effect across all executions in all
states, I use fifty execution variables that estimate the deterrent effect sepa
rately for each state.

64.

See all of the modem economics papers listed supra Section Ill.B. l .

65.

Dezhbakhsh et al., supra note 3 1 , at 352.
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2. The Model 's Technical Structure

For technically-inclined readers, I express the system symbolically:

Pa;,r = </Ji,;

+

¢i. M;,r

+

¢.J PE;,r

+

rA TD1

+

�.r ,

(2)

where M is county murder rates, Pa is the arrest rate for murder in each
county, Psl a is the conditional probability of receiving a death sentence if
arrested, Pels is the conditional probability of execution if sentenced to
death row, Z is a series of economic and demographic variables, PE is police
payroll expenditure, JE is public expenditure on all participants in the judi
cial system, PI is partisan influence as measured by the Republican
presidential candidate's percentage of the statewide vote in the most recent
election, PA is prison admissions, TD is a set of time dummies that capture
national trends in these perceived probabilities, and r; , � and sare error
terms.
3. The Model 's Details
The first equation measures the response of the behavior of criminals to
the deterrent factors while controlling for a series of other factors found in
the series Z. To determine whether a change in the murder rate is really due
to the deterrent variables, the equation permits us to make sure that the other
factors are not really the cause of the change. First, Z includes the aggra
vated assault and robbery rates because some murders are the by-products of
violent activities such as aggravated assault and robbery. Including these
variables permits us to see whether a change in the murder rate is due to a
change in the deterrent variables, or is instead due to a change in the number
of aggravated assaults or robberies.
In addition, Z measures possible economic and demographic influences
on crime. Economic variables are used as proxy for legitimate and illegiti
mate earning opportunities. An increase in legitimate earning opportunities
increases the opportunity cost of committing crime, and should result in a
decrease in the crime rate. For example, if more higher-paying jobs become
available, then criminals may stop committing crimes and obtain these jobs
instead. Likewise, an increase in illegitimate earning opportunities increases
the expected benefits of committing crime, and should result in an increase
in the crime rate.
The economic variables that I use are real per capita personal income,
real per capita unemployment insurance payments, and real per capita in
come maintenance payments. The income variable measures both the labor
market prospects of potential criminals and the amount of wealth available
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to steal. The unemployment payments variable is a proxy for overall labor
market conditions and the availability of legitimate jobs for potential crimi
nals. The transfer payments variable represents other nonmarket income
earned by poor or unemployed people.
Demographic variables include population density, and six gender and
race segments of the population ages ten to twenty-nine (male, female;
black, white, other). Population density is included to capture any relation
ship between drug activities in inner cities, which are correlated with
population density, and the murder rate. For example, an increase in crime
in a county may not be due to changes in the deterrent variables, but instead
to increasing population density.
The age, gender, and race variables represent the possible differential
treatment of certain segments of the population by the justice system,
changes in the opportunity cost of time through the life cycle, and gen
der/racially based differences in earning opportunities. For example, an
increase in crime could be due to an increase in the number of young mi
norities, who, because of racial discrimination by employers, have no
legitimate job opportunities, and must instead tum to crime.
The control variables also include the state level National Rifle Associa
tion (NRA) membership rate. It is possible that the level of gun ownership
could affect the crime level, either up or down.66
The last three equations measure the influences on the level of effort of
law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system in apprehending,
convicting, and punishing perpetrators. Police and judicial/legal expendi
ture, PE and JE, represent spending on enforcement. As more expenditures
increase law enforcement's capabilities, the probabilities of both arrest and
conviction given arrest should increase.
Partisan influence, indicating whether a jurisdiction is conservative, is
used to capture any political pressure to get tough with criminals, a message
popular with Republican candidates. The influence is exerted through
changing the makeup of the court system, such as the appointment of new
judges or prosecutors who are tough on crime. This affects the justice sys
tem and is, therefore, included in equations (3) and (4).
Prison admission, defined as the number of new court commitments ad
mitted during each year,67 is a proxy for the existing burden on the justice
system. The burden may affect judicial outcomes. For example, judges may
hesitate to impose long sentences if the jails have recently been filled with
many new sentenced prisoners.
As is standard and appropriate in such analysis, all four equations also
include a set of time dummy variables that capture national trends and influ
ences affecting all counties but varying over time. The variables correct for
the possibility that a change in murder rate may be due, not to the deterrent
variables, but to national trends in murder rates. In addition, county dum
mies are included to control for unobservable variables that differ among
counties, such as differences in crime, attitudes towards crime, or differ
ences in the justice system. Two states may continually have different
66.

Lott, Jr. & Mustard, supra note 62.

67.

This does not include returns of parole violators, escapees, failed appeals, or transfers.
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murder rates, not because of differences in the deterrent variables, but be
cause of other unobservable differences between the two states. The county
dummy variables will capture any factors that I have not otherwise included
that are constant for a county over time.
As is normal and appropriate, I estimate the simultaneous system of
69
68
equations ( 1 )-(4) with a corrected two-stage least squares regression.
4. The Model's Six Variations
Following my earlier paper's analysis, I estimated six different versions
70
of my model. The models differ only in the way that the perceived prob
abilities of a death sentence and execution are measured. Estimating these
probabilities in different ways is standard in empirical crime papers and
even dates back to Ehrlich's first capital punishment paper. 71 I based the
variant models on those most often seen in the literature.
For Model 1 , the conditional execution probability-the probability that
a person with a death sentence is actually executed-is measured by execu
tions at year t divided by number of death sentences six years earlier, at year
t-6. For Model 2 this probability is measured by number of executions six
years in the future at t+6, divided by the number of death sentences at t. The
two ratios reflect forward looking and backward looking expectations, re
spectively. The displacement lag of six years reflects the lengthy waiting
time between sentencing and execution, which averages six years for the
period I study.72
For the probability of a death sentence given that a person has been ar
rested, I use a two-year lag displacement, reflecting an estimated two-year
lag between arrest and sentencing. Therefore, the conditional sentencing
probability for Model 1 is measured by the number of death sentences in
year t divided by the number of arrests for murder at year t..:i.. For Model 2
this probability is measured by number of death sentences at t+2 divided by
number of arrests for murder at t. Because of the absence of an arrest lag
arrests usually occur soon after a murder-no lag displacement is used to

68. The estimation is weighted to correct for the heteroskedasticity of the error term. These
equations represent the aggregation of an individual's equations. In the individual equations, the
error terms are stochastic with mean zero and variance c 2 Because of this, when the error terms
are summed over n (the number of people in the county), the new error terms are heteroskedastic
because their variances ( c 2 / n ) are proportional to county population. Tests for
heteroskedasticity indicate that the error term in the unweighted regression is indeed
heteroskedastic. Tests indicate that the heteroskedasticity has been corrected after weighting by the
square root of the county population. In addition, tests for overidentification indicate that the model
is correctly specified and employs valid instruments.
•

69. I chose a single-equation method, two-stage least squares, over a systems method be
cause in a systems method any specification error in one equation is propagated throughout the
system, which can lead to inconsistency. WILLIAM H. GREENE, EcoNOMETRIC ANALYSIS 6 1 6 (2d ed.
1 993). Single-equation methods, such as two-stage least squares, confine the error to the particular
equation in which it appears.
70.

Dezhbakhsh, et al., supra note 3 1 , at 36 1 .

71.

See Ehrlich, supra note 1 9.

72.

THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note

8.
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measure the arrest probability. It is simply the number of murder-related
arrests at t divided by the number of murders at t.
These measures are not the true probabilities of arrest, sentencing, or
execution. Instead, they are averages. However, they are closer to the prob
abilities as viewed by potential murderers than would be the true measures.
This formulation from our previous paper is consistent with a previous study
that shows that criminals form perceptions based on observations of friends
.
73
and acquamtances.
For Model 3, I measure the conditional probability of execution given a
death sentence by using a six-year moving average. The probability of exe
cution at year t is defined as the sum of executions during (t+2, t+ l , t, t- 1 , t2, and t-3) divided by the sum of death sentences issued during (t-4, t-5, t-6,
t-7, t-8, and t-9). The six-year window length and the six-year displacement
lag capture the average time from sentence to execution for my sample. In a
similar fashion, a two-year lag and a two-year window length is used to
measure the conditional death sentencing probabilities. Given the absence of
an arrest lag, no averaging or lag displacement is used when computing ar
rest probabilities.
Models 4, 5, and 6 are similar to Models 1 , 2, and 3 except for the way
they treat undefined probabilities. In several years some counties had no
murders, and some states had no death sentences. This rendered some prob
abilities in Models 1 through 3 undefined because of a zero denominator.
Estimates in Models 1 through 3 are obtained excluding these observations.
To avoid losing data points in Models 4 through 6, for any observation
(county/year) where the probabilities of arrest or execution are undefined, I
substituted the relevant probability from the most recent year when the prob
ability was not undefined. I look back up to four years, because in most cases
this eradicates the problem of undefined probabilities. The assumption under
lying such substitution is that criminals will use the most recent information
available in forming their expectations. So a person contemplating committing
a crime at year t will not assume that he will not be arrested if no crime was
committed, and hence no arrest was made, during this period. Rather, he will
form an impression of the arrest odds based on arrests in recent years. This
74
approach mirrors that in earlier published research.
None of the models is necessarily more theoretically correct than the
others. They each represent a different way that criminals may think about
their probability of execution, for example, do criminals think about how
many people were sentenced to death row six years ago and how many peo
ple were executed this year (Models 1 and 4), or do they consider how many
people were sentenced to death row this year and how many people they
expect to be executed six years from now (Models 2 and 5), or do they apply
an averaging approach and consider the sum of how many people have been
73.

Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime, 99 J.

PoL. EcoN.

1 272 (199 1 ).

74. See id. For the states that have never had an execution, the conditional probability of
execution takes a value of zero. For the states that have never sentenced anyone to death row, the
conditional probability of a death row sentence takes a value of zero.
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executed recently and will be in the next few years versus the sum of how
many people were sent to death row over a six-year period in the past (Mod
els 3 and 6)? Because no one is sure which model best describes how
criminals perceive risks, I present results from all of them.
C. Empirical Results
The results are striking. Executions deter murder in a few states, have no
impact in a few more, but increase murders in many more states than the
number where there is deterrence.
The results of the two-stage least squares, weighted estimation with
fixed effects, is reported in the table in Appendix 4. Although I estimate the
entire simultaneous equation system ( 1)-(4) for each of the six variations of
the model separately, I report in the table the results of only the murder
equation ( 1 ) ; this is the equation that reveals the relationship between execu
tions and the murder rate. 75 The table presents the results of all six variations
of the model because none of the models is necessarily most correct.
The table reports the total effect of the execution probability on the
murder rate in each state. For each state and model, the regression coeffi
cient (top number) indicates the magnitude and direction of the effect. A
negative coefficient indicates deterrence. A positive coefficient indicates that
executions instead increase murders. In the capital punishment literature, an
increase in murders because of executions is often referred to as a "brutali
zation effect." Executions create an atmosphere of brutality that spurs
criminals to more violence.
7 5. The effects of many other variables on murder are also consistent across models. As
expected, the murder rate has a statistically significant, positive relationship with both the aggra
vated assault rate and the robbery rate in all six models. Many murders are committed during
another crime. The arrest rate and probability of receiving a death row sentence are negatively re
lated to the murder rate in most models, indicating a deterrent effect of these variables. However, the
probability of a death row sentence is not statistically significant in some of the models.
Many of the demographic variables also have the expected relationships with murder rates.
The percent of the county population that is African American has a statistically significant, positive
relationship with murder in most of the models. Some minority groups have fewer legitimate earn
ing opportunities, and thus a lower opportunity cost of criminal activities relative to their white
counterparts. The percentage of the population that is male has a statistically significant, positive
relationship with murder in all models; most murders are committed by men. The percentage of the
population that is ten to nineteen years of age has a negative and significant relationship with mur
der in most of the models.
The murder rate is positively related to both per capita real income and per capita real welfare
payments in all models. This suggests that overall income measurements for a county represent the
amount of wealth available to steal in the county; as the amount of wealth available to steal in
creases, crime increases. The real per capita unemployment insurance payments have a statistically
significant, negative relationship with murder rates: more aid to unemployed people lowers their
need for criminal activity.
Population density has a statistically significant, negative relationship in all models. Although
murder rates are higher in more densely populated cities, they are not higher in more densely popu
lated counties-my unit of measurement. The majority of the most densely populated counties are
suburban counties that tend to have lower crime rates than either urban or rural counties.
The coefficients for three variables are statistically insignificant in most models: the percent
age of the population that is twenty to twenty-nine, the percentage of the population that belongs to
a minority group other than African American, and the NRA membership rate.
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Not all of the results are statistically significant. The table reports the t
statistics (bottom number) for each state and model. T-statistics equal to or
greater than 1 .645 are considered statistically significant at the 1 0% level
and t-statistics equal to or greater than 1 .96 are considered statistically sig
nificant at the 5% level. A t-statistic of 1 .645 means that there is ninety
percent certainty that the coefficient is different from zero. Empiricists typi
cally require t-statistics of at least 1 .645 to conclude that one variable affects
another in the direction indicated by the coefficient.
The results reveal large variation across states in capital punishment's
effect on murder. Among the twenty-seven states that had at least one execu
tion during the sample period, there are states where executions deter
murders. There are states where executions have no effect on murder. And
there are many states where executions increase murders.
Despite the differences in the way the conditional probabilities are esti
mated across the six models, the results for each state are quite robust.
Although the level of statistical significance differs for some models, the
direction (that is, positive or negative effect) of the statistically significant
coefficients within each ·state is the same, regardless of the model.
To permit interpretation of the results in Appendix 4, I transformed the
statistically significant coefficients from each of the six models into each
state's increase or decrease in number of murders after one execution. 76
From among these, I then selected each state's median change.
Each state's median increase or decrease in murders per execution is
graphed in Figure 2. The figure shows that the executions in six states have a
deterrent effect. For these states, the median decrease in the number of mur
ders from each execution ranges from sixty-one in South Carolina to six in
Nevada. Eight states experience no change in murders after executions.

76. The coefficients in Table I are the partial derivatives of murder per 1 00,000 population
with respect to each model's measure of the probability of execution given sentencing. Given the
measurement of these variables, the following transformations give the change in the number of
murders as a result of one execution in 1 996 (the most recent year of data):

B3 (Population199/l 00,000) ( l !S1990) for models 1 and 4,
BJ (Population1990/100,000) ( l lS1990) for models 2 and 5,
BJ (Population199/l 00,000) ( ll[S1992+ S1991+ S1990+ S1989+S1988+S1987] for models
3 and 6,
where S is the number of individuals sentenced to death. I perform these transformations for
every coefficient in Table I that is significant at the 10% level. Then, I find the median result of the
transformations for each state to obtain the median increase or decrease in number of murders after
one execution. I use medians instead of means so that the numbers will not be influenced by ex
treme outliers. Results using the mean value of the transformations are similar.
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FIGURE 2
I NDIVIDUAL STATE DETERRENT EFFECTS:
NUMBER OF M URDERS DETERRED OR INCITED
BY AN AVERAGE EXECUTION
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In contrast, thirteen states have a median increase in murders after each
execution, suggesting a brutalization effect. The magnitude of the increase
ranges from three in Oklahoma to 1 75 in Utah and Oregon. 77 However, three
of the states experiencing an increase-Idaho, Maryland, and Oregon
performed only one execution during my sample period. Much caution is in
order before drawing conclusions based on the experience of one execution.
Figure 2 reports a very different picture from the previous empirical
studies that found that executions deterred murders. In many states, execu
tions have a brutalization effect, increasing the number of murders. In
contrast, a deterrent effect exists in far fewer states. Likewise, more than
three times as many states have a brutalization effect or no effect (twenty
one) than have a deterrent effect (six).
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations permit a very rough estimate of
the sizes of the brutalization and deterrent effects for states that are above
and below the threshold. We can also get some idea of the net effect. It
should be recognized that, because of the calculation method, the estimates
are very imprecise. Nonetheless, they provide some idea of orders of magni
tude.

77. The special characteristics of the executions in Utah and Oregon may cause the large
increase in murders. Utah has executed people by firing squad, and Oregon executed only one per
son during the sample period.

232

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 1 04:203

There were 192 executions between 1 977 and 1 996 in deterrent states,
fifty-four in no-effect states, and 1 12 in brutalization states. I multiplied the
median number of murders deterred or incited in each state by the total
number of executions in each state to compute the net lives saved or lost. In
deterrent states over the twenty-year sample period, executions saved ap
proximately 6,91 8 lives.
Subtracting the 1 92 executions yields a net lives saved of 6,726, or ap
proximately 336 per year. In no-effect states, fifty-four lives were lost, all
executions.
In brutalization states, the 1 1 2 executions caused approximately 5,246
murders-again, this estimate is very rough. Adding the 1 1 2 executions
yields the total lives lost of 5,358. This was 268 per year.
Although these estimates are inexact, they do suggest that both the de
terrent and brutalization effects can be substantial. Executions save many
lives in deterrent states. But, in brutalization states, they lead to the deaths of
almost as many innocent people.
The following rough comparison of the lives saved in deterrent states
and lost in brutalization states suggests that, for the country as a whole,
capital punishment saves lives. That is, considering the country as a whole
and adding the effects in every state that conducts capital punishment, my
results suggest, if with imprecision, that executions save lives. Said another
way, if the country's only choices were either to continue with the present
levels of executions in each state or end executions in all states, then con
tinuing the executions saves lives.
Considering the lives only of innocent people-ignoring the deaths of
the convicts whom executions kill directly-capital punishment saves lives.
Subtracting the murders caused in the brutalization states (very roughly
5,246) from those saved in the deterrence states (6,9 1 8) shows that net lives
saved nationwide from executions is 1 ,672, or eighty-four per year. Capital
punishment even saves lives if we add in the lives of those who are exe
cuted. Subtracting both the 5,358 total lives lost in brutalization states,
including the lives of those executed and the additional murders caused by
the executions, and the fifty-four executions in no-effect states, from the
6,726 net lives saved in deterrent states yields a net saving of 1 ,3 14, or
sixty-six per year.
The results also show that, if saving lives were the only goal, the present
pattern of executions is bad policy. Although capital punishment's net effect
is now to save lives, thousands more lives could be saved if states with ei
ther no-effect or net brutalization ceased executing people. If only the
deterrence states continued with their executions, then 6,9 1 8 innocent lives
would be saved, or 346 per year-far more than the present system's eighty
four per year. Because of the brutalization in many states, the present system
causes approximately 262 innocent people each year to die unnecessarily.
If we also consider the lives of those executed, the present system looks
even worse. If only deterrence states continued executions, then a net of
6, 726, or 336 per year, would be saved, compared to only 1 ,3 14, or sixty-six
per year, if the present system continues. That is, approximately 270 people
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per year now die unnecessarily because of capital punishment in states
where it does not deter.
D . Reconciliation with Other Papers

This Article's results are consistent with the findings of deterrence in
previous economics papers. The weighted average of all of the increases or
decreases shown in Figure 1 , where the weights are each state's total num
ber of executions between 1977 and 1 996, is a negative 4.5; each execution
deters, on average, 4.5 murders. Because states with a deterrent effect have
large numbers of executions, the average nationwide effect per execution is
deterrence, even though the effect in most states is brutalization or no effect.
That is, when estimating the average effect on murders across all states, in
stead of estimating separate effects for each state, the results indicate a
deterrent effect.78 When all states are lumped together, the deterrent effect in
six states conceals both the brutalization effect in thirteen states and the
complete absence of effect in the rest.
Moreover, the results help us to understand the results of the non
economics papers that find no deterrence. These papers tend to focus on
individual jurisdictions, rather than on the United States as a whole. Like
those papers, my present research shows that, in many states, executions do
not deter.
The results also are consistent with Richard Berk's recent paper, which
suggested that findings of a deterrent effect in nationwide estimates disap
pear if certain states such as Texas are eliminated from the analysis. 79 My
results show that Texas is one of the states with a large deterrent effect. If
Texas' deterrent effect and large number of executions are excluded from
national averages, then it is not surprising that the nationwide average deter
rent effect would become smaller; there would be fewer executions with a
deterrent effect to outweigh the executions with a brutalization effect.
IV. A THRESHOLD EFFECT HELPS TO EXPLAIN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT'S DIFFERING IMPACTS ACROSS STATES

I now examine possible causes of the different effects of executions in
different states. First, I examine summary statistics of the characteristics of
states with a deterrent effect, states with no effect, and states with a brutali
zation effect. Then, I perform additional regressions on the characteristics
that differ significantly among the three groups of states. Finally, I discuss
the results' implications.
To summarize, the analysis suggests a threshold effect. In states with
fewer than a threshold of approximately nine executions during the sample
78.
My results are consistent with a recent study that shows that, in analyses that estimate
capital punishment's average effect on murders across all states, dropping certain states from the
analyses makes the overall deterrent effect disappear. Berk, supra note 5 1 .
79.

See id.
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period, each execution increases the number of murders. In states that ex
ceed the threshold, executions deter murder. Deterrence and nondeterrence
states are not different in a statistically significant way in the other factors
that I examine, such as how much publicity executions receive, the charac
teristics of the executed people, and the method of execution.
A . Summary Statistics
I group the states that had at least one execution into three groups: states
with a deterrent effect (Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, South Carolina,
and Texas), states with no effect (Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming), and states with a
brutalization effect (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Washington).
Table 2 reports the mean and median values of seven characteristics for
each group of states, including the average amount of capital punishment,
the amount of publicity that executions receive in the states, the characteris
tics of the executed people, and the execution method. For each
characteristic, I also perform a mean comparison test between the states
with a deterrent effect and all other states. The results of this test indicate
whether the difference between the means is statistically significant.
TABLE 2
C HARACTERISTICS OF S TATES WHERE EXECUTIONS DETER M URDERS,
EXECUTIONS

H AVE No EFFECT ON MURDERS, AND

EXECUTIONS INCREASE MURDERS
T-statistic
from Mean
Comparison
Test Between

Total Number of
Executions
Total Number of
Death Row
Sentences
Average Publicity
per Execution
% of Executions
That Were SingleVictim Offenders

States with

Deterrent

States with

States with

Brutalization

States and

Deterrent Effect

No Effect

Effect

Other States

32 (mean)
1 6.5 (median)
31 2.8
1 77.5

6.7
3
1 49.3
1 37.5

8.6
5
1 42.2
90

2.7 1 *

63.8
54.8
70.7
81.1

36.6
37
80.1
89.1

1 1 6.2
80.5
50.37
62.5

1 .97+

.76
.58
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T-statistic
from Mean
Comparison
Test Between

% of Executions
That Were
Offenders with No
Prior Felony
Record
% of Executions
That Were
Offenders not on
Probation, Parole,
Escape, or
Imprisoned

States with

Deterrent

States with

States with

Brutalization

States and

Deterrent Effect

No Effect

Effect

Other States

24.6
22.5

41 .2
27.3

1 8.2
1 6.7

.17

50.4
47.0

87.4
100

42.6
50

.62

1 2.02
1 .04
34.67
% of Executions
25
0
bv Electrocution
10
0
Notes: The mean (top number) and median (bottom number) of each variable are reported. "*"
indicates that the test is significant at the 5% level; "+" indicates that the test is significant at the
1 0% level.

1 . Amount of Capital Punishment
First, I examine differences between the groups in their total number of
executions and total number of death row sentences to determine if the fre
quency of executions or death row sentences is related to a state's deterrent
or brutalization effect. The execution numbers differ substantially. States
with a deterrent effect performed an average of thirty-two executions be
tween 1 977 and 1 996. States with either no effect or a brutalization effect
conducted far fewer executions: approximately one-quarter as many, on av
erage. States with no effect performed an average of 6.7 executions, while
states with a brutalization effect performed an average of 8.6 executions
during this period.
The pattern is similar for death row sentences. Again, deterrent states
have far more death row sentences than states with no effect or a brutaliza
tion effect: more than twice as many, on average. However, brutalization
states have the fewest death row sentences, with no-effect states averaging
slightly more than brutalization states.
Mean comparison tests indicate that the average total number of execu
tions are statistically different between deterrent states and other states at the
5% level. Likewise, the average values of the total number of death row sen
tences are statistically different between deterrence states and other states at
the 10% level.
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2. Publicity
If executions are to have any effect on murders, the publicity surround
ing each execution should influence the magnitude of the effect. so Mean and
median publicity per execution is somewhat higher for brutalization states,
perhaps because the executions in the states were often the states' first exe
cution after the moratorium. In contrast, in states where executions are
frequent, each execution receives relatively little attention, however, mean
comparison tests indicate that there is no statistically significant difference
between deterrent states and other states in the average publicity per execu
tion.s1
3 . Characteristics of Executed Persons
I explore differences in the types of people executed to determine
whether this influences the different effect of capital punishment in the
states. Regression results from a separate project confirm that the deterrent
effect is larger for executions of people who have killed multiple victims
(instead of one victim), executions of people with no prior felony record,
and executions of people who were not on probation or parole or had es
caped from prison.s2 However, the mean and median values of these
characteristics are similar across the deterrent states, brutalization states,
and the no-effect states. Moreover, mean-comparison tests indicate that
, there is no significant difference in the types of people executed among the
three groups of states.
4. Method of Execution
Finally, I compare the average method of execution between the groups.
During this period, most executions were performed by electrocution or le
thal injection. Other studies have found that electrocution deters more
people than lethal injection. s3 Although deterrent states appear to have used
electrocution more frequently than other states, the difference between the
means is not statistically significant.

80. Regression results from another project I am working on suggest that the more publicity
each execution receives, the greater the deterrent effect.
81.

See supra note 5 8 and accompanying text fo r a description of the publicity measure.

82.

See Joanna M . Shepherd, Executions, Deterrence, and the Characteristics of the Person

Executed (2005) (unpublished regressions) (on file with author). The full theoretical explanation of

these results is beyond the scope of this paper. The varying deterrent effects for executions of
different types of criminals is probably caused by both the publicity surrounding the different types
of criminals and by how similar potential criminals think they are to the executed criminal.
83.

Zimmerman, Alternative Execution Methods, supra note 40.
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5. The Threshold Effect
Of the four factors, the only characteristics that vary significantly be
tween deterrent states and nondeterrent states are the total number of
executions performed in the state and the total number of death row sen
tences imposed in the state. Not only is the overall deterrent effect larger
with a greater number of executions or death row sentences, the deterrent
effect per execution is also larger.
The summary statistics are our initial indication that deterrence is sub
ject to a threshold effect. On average, executions begin to deter murders
only after some threshold number of executions has been performed. Until a
state executes that number, its executions either have no effect on the num
ber of murders or are counterproductive, causing a brutalization effect that
increases murders.
Other differences among states may also be important in determining
whether a state experiences a deterrent effect. Most of these, however, are
impossible to measure. Possible important differences include, among oth
ers, racist application of the death penalty, how prosecutors' charging
decisions are made, and the manner in which authorities determine when or
if to execute a condemned prisoner.
B. Regression Results
I perform additional regressions to explore the threshold effect in more
detail. First, I perform a spline regression to examine how the relationship
between murders and executions changes as a state's total number of execu
tions increases. Then, I perform a dummy-variable regression to examine
the effect on murder rates of conducting executions when states are below
the threshold compared to above the threshold. 84
1 . Spline Regression
A spline regression is a statistical method for determining whether there
is a structural change, or threshold, in the relationship between two vari
ables. 85 My summary statistics have suggested that states may experience a
brutalization effect as they begin to perform executions, but at some thresh
old level of executions, a deterrent effect emerges. Spline regressions can
test for such knots or thresholds in the murder rate as a state's total number
of executions increases. The regressions can explore whether the direction
of capital punishment's effect on murder depends on how many executions a
state has performed.
The system of equations is similar to the system I used to estimate sepa
rate deterrent effects for individual states. Indeed, all variables are defined
84. Unreported regressions exploring the relationship between murder and the number of
executions per prisoner yield similar results to those reported below.
85.

See GREENE, supra note 69, at 237.
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as before, except that the death row sentence and execution variables are
replaced with a variable, ;,,, that measures the number of executions when
states are below the threshold number and the number when they are above
the threshold. The system of equations I estimate is:

I test for a threshold at nine total executions since 1 977. The summary
statistics suggest that the threshold may occur at approximately this number;
a threshold of nine executions is above the mean total number for brutaliza
tion states but below the median total number for deterrent states. My
regression will test for the existence of this threshold by measuring the ef
fect on murder rates of additional executions when states have performed
less than nine executions since 1 977 versus when they have performed nine
or more executions since 1 977.
The results of the spline regression are reported in the first column of
Table 3. I report both the coefficients and the t-statistics for the variable
measuring the number of below-threshold executions and for the variable
measuring the number of above-threshold executions. The coefficients rep
resent the slope of the relationship between the total number of executions
performed before that date and murder rate.
TABLE

3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS
SINCE

1 977 AND M URDER RATES
Coefficients!T-statistics

Variables

Dummy-Variable
Regression

Spline Regression
Below-the-Threshold States: States
with 1 -8 Executions

.05
1 .99*

.28
3.68*

Above-the-Threshold States: States
with 9 or More Executions

-.04
1 0.52*

-1 .23
1 0.51 *

The results suggest that below-threshold executions have a brutalization
effect and above-threshold executions have a deterrent effect. The statisti
cally significant, positive coefficient for the below-threshold variable
indicates that, when states have conducted fewer than nine executions, each
execution increases the murder rate. The statistically significant, negative
coefficient for the above-threshold variable indicates that, when states have
performed nine or more executions, each execution decreases the murder
rate.
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I also test other numbers, instead of nine, as the possible threshold level.
Although I do not report the coefficients from all of these regressions, the
results indicate that the threshold number is somewhere between six and
eleven executions. Thresholds between six and eleven produce statistically
significant coefficients that are similar in magnitude to the coefficients when
nine is treated the threshold level; thresholds below six and above eleven
produce statistically insignificant results. Thus, the exact threshold is likely
state-specific; it will vary between six and eleven depending on the state's
characteristics.
2. Dummy-Va riable Regressions

I also perform dummy-variable regressions to test the presence of a
threshold effect. Whereas the spline regression estimates the change in mur
der rates with each additional execution when the state's total number of
executions is below versus above the threshold, a dummy-variable regres
sion estimates the effect on murder rates of simply being a below-threshold
state versus an above-threshold state. That is, a spline regression answers the
question: What is the effect on murder rates of performing one more execu
tion if a state has performed fewer than nine (or other possible threshold)
executions? A dummy-variable regression answers the question: What is the
effect on murder rates of having performed fewer than nine executions?
The dummy-variable regression will estimate a system of equations
similar to the spline regression's system of equations:

(8)
where BT stands for "below the threshold" and takes values of one if a
state has performed from one to eight executions between 1 977 and the year
in question, and zero otherwise. The variable AT stands for "above the
threshold" and takes values of one if a state has performed nine or more
executions between 1 977 and the year in question, and zero otherwise. The
coefficient on BT is the difference in murder rates between states that have
performed between one and nine executions and states that either have per
formed no executions or nine or more executions. The coefficient on AT is
the difference in murder rates between states that have performed between
one and nine executions and states that have performed either no executions
or fewer than nine executions.
The results of the dummy-variable regression are reported in the second
column of Table 3. The statistically significant, positive coefficient on the
below-the-threshold variable indicates that executions have a brutalization
effect when states have performed fewer than the nine executions. The sta
tistically significant, negative coefficient on the above-the-threshold variable
indicates that executions have a deterrent effect when states have performed
nine or more executions.
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C. Explaining Brutalization, Deterrence,
and the Threshold Effect
The results of the summary statistics, spline regression, and dummy
variable regressions are consistent in finding a threshold effect. As states
begin to perform executions, the first executions do not deter crime. Instead,
they either have no statistically significant effect on the murder rate, or the
executions have a brutalization effect, increasing murders. However, when
the number of executions reaches a threshold level of nine or so over the
past twenty years, additional executions begin to have a deterrent effect and
murder rates decrease.
My finding of a brutalization effect of executions in states with few exe
cutions confirms empirically what some scholars have predicted
theoretically. It has been theorized that executions might increase murder,
not deter them, and that the brutalization effect is the consequence of the
beastly example that executions present. 86 Executions devalue human life
and "demonstrate that it is correct and appropriate to kill those who have
87
gravely offended us." Thus, the lesson taught by capital punishment may
be "the legitimacy of lethal vengeance, not of deterrence."88
My results suggest that a substantial brutalization effect is generally pre
sent after an execution, regardless how many executions the state has
already conducted recently.
Figure 3 provides a way of understanding this. As shown in Figure 3 's
marginal brutalization curve, regardless of how many executions a state has
already conducted, an additional execution has a tendency to increase mur
ders substantially.

86.

CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PuNISHMENTS 50 (H. Paolucci trans., 1 964) ( 1 764).

William J. Bowers & Glenn Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What is the Effect of
87.
Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453, 456 ( 1 980).
88.

Cochran et al., supra note 46, at 1 1 0.

Deterrence versus Brutalization

November 2005]

FIGURE

241

3

MARGINAL DETERRENT A ND BRUTALIZATION EFFECTS FROM
ADDITIONAL EXECUTIONS
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My results suggest that the additional, marginal brutalization effect of an
additional execution decreases as a state commits more executions. Accord
ing to the results, the brutalization effect of a state's first execution can be
large. For example, the results show that the single execution that Oregon
conducted induced approximately 175 murders. So it appears that the first
state-sponsored killing can induce many private copycat killings. Additional
executions, however, appear not to add as much as the first execution to the
state's environment of violence. Thus, Figure 3's marginal brutalization
curve slopes down from left to right.89
Executions also create a countervailing effect. Each additional execution
increases the projected probability, in potential criminal minds, that murder
will result in execution. Thus, in Figure 3, the curve for the deterrent effect
slopes up from left to right: the more executions that a state has already
conducted, the more that each additional execution deters. When a state
conducts more executions, potential criminals begin to realize that execution
could possibly be imposed on them. With increasing numbers of executions,
criminals begin to change their behavior; they commit fewer murders to
avoid the risk of execution. For example, in Texas, each execution deters
many murders because the state's many other executions have demonstrated
to potential criminals that it will execute people who murder. In contrast, in
89. The brutalization curve may also be flat in some jurisdictions. The marginal brutalization
effect would still be eventually outweighed by the marginal deterrent effect.
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a state that has executed only a single person in the last twenty years, crimi
nals may remain unconvinced that the state has the fortitude to execute more
people.
My results suggest that the brutalization effect initially outweighs the
deterrent effect. As Figure 3 shows, until a state conducts approximately
nine executions, each execution's tendency to breed brutality and violence
outweighs the execution's tendency to deter it; until nine executions, the
brutalization curve is above the deterrence curve. However, in a state with
more than nine executions, each additional execution's growing deterrent
effect finally exceeds the brutalization effect. After a state conducts a num
ber of executions that exceeds the threshold, some people may still be
induced to kill by an execution. The number of murders eliminated through
deterrence, however, now exceeds the number caused by brutalization.
There could be other, unmeasured factors that determine whether states
experience deterrence, no effect, or brutalization. This is suggested by the
fact that not all states that have performed many executions experience de
terrence and not all states that have performed few executions experience
brutalization. My statistically significant empirical results, however, indicate
that the number of executions a state has performed is a fundamental deter
minant of capital punishment's effect in the state.
v. OTHER MODELS

To confirm the different impacts across states, I test the individual ef
fects of capital punishment among states using two other data sets. The data
sets include a monthly, state-level data set from 1 977 to 1 999, and an an
nual, state-level data set from 1 960 to 2000. I have used these exact data sets
in my other studies of capital punishment's deterrent effect and other capital
punishment researchers have used similar data sets. I am now, for the first
time, using the data to estimate separate deterrent effects for individual
states.
We should expect some differences among the data sets in the states that
fall into each group: deterrent, no effect, and brutalization. In some states
where the increase or decrease in murders after an execution is short-lived,
the monthly data may pick up a statistically significant deterrent or brutali
zation effect that the annual data did not. Conversely, in some states where
there are important demographic, economic, or jurisdictional differences
among counties, the county-level data may pick up a statistically significant
effect that state-level data did not. The varying time periods of the data sets
may also result in differences if states experienced deterrence or brutaliza
tion during some years, but not others. Nevertheless, the results from the
other data sets can support the primary data set's evidence that capital pun
ishment has different impacts in different states.
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A. State-Level Monthly Data: 1977-1999
First, I estimate different effects of capital punishment among states us
ing monthly data on homicides, executions, and other variables at the state
level over the period 1 977- 1 999. I used this data set in another recently pub
lished study in The Journal of Legal Studies. Because the data and models
were peer reviewed for the journal, I will use the same data, variables, and
models augmented to measure individual state effects.
Analyzing monthly data has a potential advantage over annual data be
cause it allows me to observe brief fluctuations in murder rates after
executions; however, the monthly data is at the state level, so I cannot con
trol for the demographic, economic, and jurisdictional differences among
U.S. counties that can affect murder rates.
My state-level, monthly data set includes variables similar to the pri
mary data set already discussed. It includes data on murders, executions,
death penalty sentences, per capita income, unemployment rates, and several
demographic characteristics. The only important difference is that the
monthly data set does not include arrests for murder because this variable is
not collected monthly.
m
i.t fJpETER;,, + {J2 ECON;,, + {J3 DEM0;,1 + /J4s; + /J5Y, + fJ6m, + £;,, (9)
n;,,
where min is the murder rate (murders/100,000 population) in state i in
month t.
The variable DETER stands for the vector of deterrence variables: the
probability of a death row sentence and the probability of execution. The
probability of a death row sentence in a given month is defined as a moving
average of the number of death row sentences in the current and previous
eleven months divided by a similar twelve-month moving average of the
number of murders. The probability of execution is defined as a twelve
month moving average of the number of executions divided by a twelve
month moving average of the number of people on death row. Although in
the original publication I used one execution variable to estimate the average
deterrent effect across all executions in all states, I now use fifty execution
variables that estimate the deterrent effect separately for each state.
The variable ECON is a vector of economic variables: the real per capita
monthly income in the state and the monthly unemployment rate in the
state. The variable DEMO is a vector of demographic variables: the percent
age of the county population that is between ten and twenty-nine years of
age, the percentage of the county population that is male, the percentage of
the county population that is African American, and the percentage of the
county population that is some minority group other than African American.
The variable y is a series of year dummies, the variable m is a series of
monthly dummies, and the variable s is a series of state dummy variables.
=
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I estimate equation (9) using a weighted least-squares regression with
9°
fixed effects. Fixed effects estimation can control for the unobservable het
erogeneity arising from state-specific attributes that could otherwise result
in biased estimation.
The results of the regression suggest that capital punishment's effect var
ies across states. In the monthly, state-level data, capital punishment has a
statistically significant deterrent effect in six states, no effect in fifteen
states, and a statistically significant brutalization effect in eight states (see
Table 4).9 1 Although there are some differences in the states in each cate
gory, thirteen states remain in the same category as in the primary, county
level data.
TABLE 4
STATE- LEVEL MONTHLY DATA: 1 9 77 - 1 999:
D IFFERING IMPACTS AMONG STATES AND TOTAL
NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS

T-statistic from
Mean
Comparison Test
Between
States with
Deterrent Effect

States with No
Effect

States with
Brutalization
Effect

States in

Alabama,

Delaware,

Arizona,

Each

Colorado,

Florida, Idaho,

Arkansas,

Category

Kentucky,

Illinois,

California,

Louisiana, South

Mississippi,

Georgia,

Carolina, Texas

Missouri,

Indiana,

Montana,

Maryland,

Nebraska, North

Nevada,

Carolina, Ohio,

Pennsylvania

Deterrent States
and Other
States

Oklahoma,
Oregon, Utah,
Virginia,
Washington,
Wyoming
Total
Number of

45 (Mean)

1 7.9

1 1 .4

21 .5 (Median)

10

7.5

1 .92+

Executions

Moreover, the differences between the categories' total number of exe
cutions are similar to the primary, county-level results. As Table 4 reveals,
the states with deterrent effects have a substantially higher average and me90. The weight is the square root of the state population to correct the heteroskedasticity of
the error term.
91.

These states were significant at the 90% confidence level.
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dian total number of executions. Mean comparison tests indicate that the
average total number of executions is statistically different among the
groups at the six percent level. This evidence supports my threshold effect
hypothesis.
B . State-Level Annual Data: 1 960-2000
I also estimate capital punishment's differing impacts across states using
a state-level, annual data set from 1 960 to 2000. State-level, annual data has
been used in numerous capital punishment studies. I have used the exact
data used here in a recent paper, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punish
92
ment: Evidence from a Judicial Experiment.
This state-level, annual data set is more aggregated in both the time and
geographic dimension than monthly or county data. Thus, some effects that
were apparent in data that could either measure short-term, monthly changes
in murder rates or control for county-level jurisdictional differences may not
be statistically significant in more aggregated data. However, this data cov
ers a much longer time period than the other data sets. In fact, mine is the
only data set in the capital punishment literature that has data from before,
during, and after the Supreme Court moratorium in the 1 970s. Thus, this
data set may be more likely to pick up effects that lasted for only a few
years, instead of the entire time period.
Once again, I estimate one of the primary models from my original
study using this data. However, instead of estimating the average deterrent
effect across all executions in all states, I now use fifty execution variables
that estimate the deterrent effect separately for each state. The regression
equation is:
m ,,,
- =

n ;,1

/3, EXEC,_, + /32 ECON,,, + /33 DEMO,,, + /34 POLICE + /3, s, + /36y, + t:,,,

( 1 0)

where min is the murder rate (murders/1 00,000 population) in state i in
year t.
The deterrent variable is the number of executions in each state. The
economic variables (ECON) include real per capita personal income and the
unemployment rate. The demographic variables (DEMO) are the percent
ages of population age fifteen to nineteen, age twenty to twenty-four, and
belonging to a minority group.
Once again, the only important difference in the included variables be
tween this model and the primary model on county-level data is the arrest
rate; state-level murder arrests are not available for many years in this longer
time period. This model, however, does include full-time state police em
ployees (POLICE) as a nonpunishment deterrent factor; enhanced police
presence may increase detection and apprehension, deterring some criminal
activities.
92.

Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 37, at 1 3-20.
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Other controls include state indicators (s) that capture unobservable dif
ferences among states that are constant through time. Year indicators (y)
capture long-term national trends in crime.
I estimate equation ( 10) using a least-squares regression with state-fixed
effects that is weighted to correct the heteroskedasticity of the error term.
The results for the different states are in Table 5 . In the annual, state-level
data, capital punishment has a statistically significant deterrent effect in five
states, a statistically significant brutalization effect in six states, and no ef
fect in twenty-five states.93 Ten of the states remain in the same category as
in the primary, county-level regressions.
TABLE 5
STATE-LEVEL ANNUAL DATA: 1 960-2000:
DIFFERING IMPACTS AMONG STATES AND
TOTAL NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS

States with
Deterrent Effect
State-Level,
Annual Data
from 1 960-2000

Alabama,
Florida,
Georgia,
Mississippi,
Texas

Total Number of
Executions

81 .8 (Mean)
37 (Median)

93.

States with No
Effect
Arkansas,
California,
Connecticut,
Delaware, Iowa,
Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky,
Louisiana,
Maryland,
Montana, North
Carolina,
Nebraska, New
Jersey, New
Mexico,
Nevada, Ohio,
Oklahoma,
Oregon, South
Carolina,
Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia,
Washington,
Wvomino
1 4.3
5.5

States with
Brutalization
Effect

T-statistic from
Mean
Comparison
Test Between
Deterrent States
and Other
States

Arizona,
Colorado,
Illinois, Indiana,
Missouri,
Pennsylvania

1 8.5
11

These states were significant at the 90% confidence level.

3.52*
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Again, there is strong evidence for a threshold effect. Both the mean and
median total number of executions is substantially higher for the states with
a deterrent effect. Mean comparison tests confirm this; the average total
number of executions is statistically different among the groups at the five
percent level.
As we expected because of the different characteristics of the data, there
are some differences between the states in each category among the three
data sets. Nevertheless, all three data sets confirm that the impact of capital
punishment differs significantly among states. Moreover, there is strong
evidence of a threshold effect in all three data sets.
CONCLUSION

Using a large data set of all U.S. counties from 1977 to 1996, I have ex
amined whether capital punishment's impact on murder rates differs among
states. The results are striking. Of the twenty-seven states in which at least
one execution occurred during the sample period, capital punishment deters
murder in only six states. In contrast, in thirteen states, or more than twice
as many, capital punishment actually increases murder. In eight states, capi
tal punishment has no effect on the murder rate. Equivalently, in only
twenty-two percent of states did executions have a deterrent effect. In con
trast, executions induced additional murders in forty-eight percent of states.
Executions created no deterrence in seventy-eight percent of states. These
results are generally robust in models using data from other time periods
and state-level data.
The paper then explored the threshold effect that explains why a few
states have deterrence but many more others have just the opposite. On av
erage, the states where capital punishment deters murder execute many
more people than do the states where capital punishment does not deter
murder. I show that a threshold number of executions exists, which is ap
proximately nine executions during the sample period. In states that
conducted more executions than the threshold, each execution, on average,
deterred murder. In states that conducted fewer executions than the thresh
old, the executions, on average, increased the murder rate.
Perhaps each execution contributes to brutalizing the society and in
creasing murder. However, if a state executes many people, then criminals
become convinced that the state is serious about the punishment, and the
criminals start to reduce their criminal activity. When the number of execu
tions exceeds the threshold, the deterrence effect begins to outweigh the
brutalization effect.
The results suggest that earlier economic papers' focus on national aver
ages masked variation among states. When the large number of executions
in the deterrence states are averaged in with the small number of executions
in all of the other states, the large deterrent effect in the deterrence states
dominates the opposite brutalization effect in the other states. Thus the re
sult from earlier economics papers: on average, an execution in the United
States deters crime. However, this Article shows that these averages are
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powered by a handful of high-execution, high-deterrence states. In most
states, capital punishment either increases murder or has no effect. The re
sults also explain the findings of no deterrence in papers that have focused
on individual states, rather than on the nation as a whole. As the results here
show, in a large majority of states, executioas do not deter murder.
My results have three important policy implications. First, if deterrence
is the objective, then capital punishment generally succeeds in the few states
with many executions. Second, the many states with numbers of executions
below the threshold may be executing people needlessly. Indeed, instead of
deterring crime, the executions may be inducing additional murders: a rough
total estimate is that, in the many states where executions induce murders
rather than deter them, executions cause an additional 250 murders per year.
Third, to achieve deterrence, states must generally execute many people. If a
state is unwilling to establish such a large execution program, it should con
sider abandoning capital punishment.
A final word of caution is appropriate. This Article's central results are
consistent across many different models and data sets, showing conclusively
that capital punishment's impact differs widely among the states; however,
the results cannot yet offer definitive conclusions about the degree to which
capital punishment deters or induces murders in a specific state. That awaits
further work.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX I
C RIMES PU N ISHABLE BY THE D EATH PENALTY, BY S TATE

Alabama

Intentional murder with 1 8 aggravating factors.

Arizona

First-degree murder accompanied by at least 1 of 1 0 aggravating factors.

Arkansas

Capital murder with a finding of at least 1 of 1 O aggravating circumstances;
treason.

California

First-degree murder with special circumstances; train wrecking; treason;
perjury causing execution.

Colorado
Connecticut

First-degree murder with at least 1 of 1 5 aaaravatina factors; treason.
Capital felony with 8 forms of aaaravated homicide.

Delaware

First-degree murder with aaaravatina circumstances.

Florida

First-degree murder; felony murder; capital drug trafficking; capital sexual
battery.

Georgia

Murder; kidnapping with bodily injury or ransom when the victim dies;
aircraft hijacking; treason.

Idaho

First-dearee murder with aqgravating factors; aggravated kidnapping.

Illinois

First-degree murder with 1 of 1 5 aggravating circumstances.

Indiana

Murder with 1 6 aggravating circumstances.

Kansas

Capital murder with 7 aggravating circumstances.

Kentucky

Murder with aggravating factors; kidnapping with aggravating factors.

Louisiana

First-degree murder; aggravated rape of victim under age 1 2; treason.

Maryland

First-degree murder, either premeditated or during the commission of a
felony, provided that certain death eliaibilitv requirements are satisfied.

Mississippi

Capital murder; aircraft piracy.

Missouri

First-degree murder.

Montana

Capital murder with 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances; capital sexual
assault.

Nebraska

First-degree murder with a finding of at least 1 statutorily-defined
aggravating circumstance.

Nevada

First-degree murder with at least 1 of 14 aaaravating circumstances.

New Hampshire

Six categories of capital murder.

New Jersey

Knowing/purposeful murder by one's own conduct; contract murder;
solicitation by command or threat in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy.

New Mexico

First-degree murder with at least 1 of 7 statutorily-defined aggravating
circumstances.

New York

First-degree murder with 1 of 1 2 aggravating factors. (Note: On June 24,
2004, the New York death penalty statute was ruled unconstitutional.)

North Carolina

First-dearee murder.

Ohio

Aaaravated murder with at least 1 of 9 aaaravatina circumstances.

Oklahoma

First-degree murder in conjunction with a finding of at least 1 of 8 statutorily
defined aggravating circumstances.

Oregon

Aggravated murder.

Pennsylvania

First-degree murder with 1 8 aggravating circumstances.

South Carolina

Murder with 1 of 10 aaaravatina circumstances.

South Dakota

First-dearee murder with 1 of 1 O aaaravating circumstances; aaaravated
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APPENDIX 2
M ETHODS OF EXECUTION BY S TATE

Alabama
Arizona

Effective 7/1/02, lethal injection will be administered unless the inmate
requests electrocution.
Authorizes lethal injection for persons sentenced after 1 1/1 5/92; those
sentenced before that date may select lethal injection or lethal gas.

Arkansas

Authorizes lethal injection for persons committing a capital offense after
7/4/83; those who committed the offense before that date may select lethal
injection or electrocution.

California

Provides that lethal injection be administered unless the inmate requests
lethal oas.

Colorado

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Connecticut

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Delaware

Lethal Injection is the sole method. Hanging was an alternative for those
whose offense occurred prior to 6/1 3/86, but as of July 2003 no inmates on
death row were eligible to choose this alternative and Delaware dismantled
its gallows.

Florida

Allows prisoners to choose between lethal injection and electrocution

Georgia

Lethal injection is the sole method. (On October 5, 2001 , the Georgia
Supreme Court held that the electric chair was cruel and unusual
I punishment and struck down the state's use of the method)

Idaho

Authorizes firing squad only if lethal injection is "impractical".

Illinois

Lethal injection is the state's method. However, it authorizes electrocution if
lethal injection is ever held to be unconstitutional.

Indiana

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Kansas

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Kentucky

Authorizes lethal injection for those convicted after March 3 1 , 1 998; those
who committed the offense before that date may select lethal injection or
electrocution

Louisiana

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Maryland

Authorizes lethal injection for those whose capital offenses occurred on or
after 3/25/94; those who committed the offense before that date may select
lethal injection or lethal gas.

Mississippi

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Missouri

Authorizes lethal injection or lethal gas; the statute leaves unclear who
decides what method to use, the inmate or the Director of the Missouri
Department of Corrections.

Montana

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Nebraska

Electrocution is the sole method.

Nevada

Lethal injection is the sole method.

New Hampshire

Authorizes hanging only if lethal injection cannot be given.

New Jersey

Lethal injection is the sole method.

New Mexico

Lethal injection is the sole method.

New York

Lethal injection is the sole method.
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Lethal injection is the sole method.

Ohio

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Oklahoma

Authorizes electrocution if lethal injection is ever held to be unconstitutional
and firing squad if both lethal injection and electrocution are held
unconstitutional.

Oregon

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Pennsylvania

Lethal injection is the sole method.

South Carolina

Allows prisoners to choose between lethal injection and electrocution

South Dakota

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Tennessee

Authorizes lethal injection for those sentenced after Jan. 1 , 1 999; others
choose between the electric chair and lethal injection.

Texas

Lethal injection is the sole method.

Utah

Lethal Injection is the sole method of execution. Firing squad was chosen by
some inmates prior to the passage of legislation banning the practice, and is
onlv available for those inmates.

Virginia

Allows prisoners to choose between lethal injection and electrocution

Washington

Provides that lethal injection be administered unless the inmate requests
hanoino.

Wyoming

Authorizes lethal gas if lethal injection is ever held to be unconstitutional.

This table was taken verbatim from D EATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., METHODS OF EXECUTION,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=245 (last visited Aug. 26, 2005) (updating
TRACY L. SNELL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 996, at 5 tbl.3 (1 997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp96.pdf).
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AVERAGE PU BLICITY PER EXECUTION, BY STATE: 1 997-1 999

State Name

Average Newspaper
Coverage

Average News
Transcripts Coverage

Alabama

5

17

Arizona

17

41

Arkansas

21

8

California

17

1 84

Colorado

365

424

Delaware
Florida

5

21

37

1 43

Georgia

7

0

Illinois

43

47

Indiana

50

50

Kentucky

18

60

Louisiana

12

24

Maryland

80

201

Missouri

22

35

Montana

0

1

Nebraska

32

15

Nevada

23

21

North Carolina

11

31

Ohio

1 23

592

Oklahoma

10

26

Oregon

77

81

Pennsylvania

0

15

South Carolina

7

6

Texas

10

28

Utah

44

89

Virginia

14

31

Washington

71

16

254

Michigan Law Review
APPENDIX

[Vol.

1 04:203

4

INDIVIDUAL S TATE EFFECTS OF THE PROBABILITY OF
EXECUTION ON THE MURDER RATE

STATE

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Alabama

0.05

·2.50

1 .44

1 .80

-3.22

2.53

-4.91

1 .42

1 1 .03

0.02

·2.47

0.66

1 .12

6.92

2.82

8.50

9.43

1 .29

2.97

1 .56

3.42

4.70

1 .01

4.90

Arkansas

1 0.76

7.60

1 4.74

1 3.26

3.64

20.40

2.60

2.92

2.42

4.10

1 .29

4.43

California

1 2.55

20.32

27.54

1 2.45

·2.1 2

22.95

4.46

7.73

6.26

4.90

-1 .36

6.50

Delaware

- 1 6.23

-8.72

-1 4.67

-1 3.46

·9.31

-1 5.94

·1 .43

·1 .62

-1 .50

-2.29

-2.74

-1 .89

Florida

-32.96

-7.66

-39.68

-33.96

·16.18

-38.93

-1 5.96

-6. 1 3

-1 5.90

-19.10

-21 .35

-1 8.24

-4.38

-9.56

Arizona

· 1 0.64

·1 .39

-9.08

-1 1 .81

-5.76

·1 .26

-4.29

-7.61

-5.70

-5.43

Idaho

1 .95

5.34

1 .66

9.13

3.78

1 1 .32

0.45

1 .67

0.43

3.22

1 .97

4.05

Illinois

1 1 .63

·0.01

27.28

1 5.20

2.72

27.41

3.71

0.00

7.61

6.29

1 .49

9. 1 1

0.25

8.54

Georgia

9.01

2.12

1 1 .26

7.35

4.09

1 .71

4.53

4.49

0.32

4.68

Louisiana

22.51

-0.36

39.33

1 8. 1 0

·1 .09

27.28

8.38

-0.22

1 0. 1 4

8.49

-0.98

1 0.07

Maryland

7.14

4.07

1 1 .22

1 2.03

2.76

1 7.75

2.49

2.05

3.33

5.74

2.14

6.41

Mississippi

0.12

2.82

-0.75

2.57

1 .40

3.36

0.05

1 .96

-0.23

1 .1 9

1 .46

1 .36

Missouri

-0.81

26.88

3.41

1 .03

41.13

4.09

-0.31

1 0.37

1.10

0.49

24.25

1 .59

Montana

30.62

1 .24

24.08

1 4.64

3.40

1 6.28

1 .62

0. 1 1

1 .56

1 .90

0.90

1 .81

1 1 .03

3.37

·2.93

2.33

-0.84

1 .93

1 .09

0.97

-0.92

0.98

-0.73

0.81

Nevada

-1 .56

-7.76

4.58

-5.49

-1 1 .56

6.03

-0.41

-2.45

1.19

·1 .81

-5.97

1 .65

North Carolina

·2.80

1 .66

·2.32

0.70

-0.93

1 .26

-1 .69

1 .26

-1 .24

0.50

-1 .38

0.82

8.95

-0.02

9.43

6.67

-1 .03

6.91

4.25

-0.01

4.01

3.98

-1 . 1 2

3.91

Indiana

Nebraska

Oklahoma
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STATE

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Oregon

10.76

7.09

1 2.85

1 1 .49

5.26

1 5.25

2.81

1 .84

3.37

4.34

2.48

4.70

0.99

4.97

·2.62

1 .22

-0.53

4.62

-1 .02

0.81

-0. 1 6

2.33

0.89

1 .96

South Carolina

·12.10

-4.27

1 3.49

·10.16

·6.24

-1 0.73

·5.89

-3.48

·6.09

-6.04

·9.59

-5.80

Texas

-1 7.68

-2.41

·1 6.00

-1 7.54

·9.95

-1 5.28

-1 6.65

-2.97

·1 4.87

-1 9.84

·1 9.1 3

·17.18

9.59

1 2.03

4.24

9.54

9.33

9.23

2.68

4.55

1 .48

4.28

4.90

3.66

Virginia

6.84

8.03

7.38

6.52

2.25

8.98

3.94

8.16

3.81

4.63

3.71

5.91

Washington

5.56

4.64

1 1 .35

1 1 .90

4.98

1 6.64

1 .38

1 .76

3.46

5.54

2.81

6.02

4.86

·1 4.87

1 .84

2.84

-3.38

6.79

0.39

-1 .01

0.30

0.71

-1 .24

1 .73

Pennsylvania

Utah

Wyoming

•
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